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INTRODUCTION

Managing complex mass tort litigation fairly and efficiently
poses a number of intractable procedural problems. The root cause
of these problems is the inescapable tension between the interest of
individual litigants in preserving individual control of claims and
procedural fairness, on the one hand, and the interest of the judicial
*
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system in the efficient joinder of related claims, on the other. This
tension forces courts to choose among a variety of joinder techniques for balancing these basic interests. The choice is important
because our justice system relies almost exclusively on private litigation to compensate mass tort victims. 1
Mass torts occur when the conduct of one or more tortfeasors
causes a group injury where the individual tort claims within the
group have some common factual basis. The two most common
types of mass torts are mass disasters and mass distribution of defective products. 2 Mass disasters occur when a large group of individuals suffer personal injuries or death at one time and place, such as in
airplane crashes or hotel fires. 3 Mass disasters also result when sudden environmental pollution injures persons or property near the
pollution source, such as in chemical spills or nuclear reactor accidents. 4 By contrast the injuries which result from the mass distribuI

See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHi. L.
684, 687 (1941) ("[W]hether it is desirable or not, private litigation must still police large areas of modern law and provide the exclusive remedy for many large-scale
group injuries.").
2
While not all mass tort litigation fits tidily into these two general categories, the
vast majority of cases do. See infra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
3 Mass disaster cases of this type include: State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (bus crash); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (air
crash); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d
1083 (9th Cir. 1975) (air crash), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); Pan Am. World Airways
v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975) (air crash);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 382 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1967) (bus and car accident), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968); In re Texas City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952)
(ship explosion), afd sub nom. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.) (collapse of hotel walkway), vacated, 680 F.2d
1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,459 U.S. 988 (1982); Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
513 F.Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (air crash), rev'd sub nom. Ashland v. Ling-TemcoVought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D.
Ky. 1977) (fire at Beverly Hills Supper Club), mandamus deniedsub nom. Union Light, Heat
& Power Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978) (mandamus to
order postponement of trial in federal cases until state cases decided), cert. dismissed, 443
U.S. 913 (1979); Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (food or water poisoning on pleasure cruise); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Ahrens, 414 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (food poisoning); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, 68 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (air crash); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66
F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975) (air crash); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D.
558 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (food or water poisoning on pleasure cruise), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d
1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1975); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(bus crash), aft'd, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946 (1974); Hobbs v.
Northeast Airlines,, 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (air crash); American Trading & Prod.
Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Il. 1969) (fire at convention
center); McMurray v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (property damage from military flights); D'Amico v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 323, 167
Cal. Rptr. 254 (1980) (food poisoning on pleasure cruise); Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d
131 (La. 1977) (food poisoning in prison).
4
Mass disaster cases of this type include: Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973) (lake water pollution); In re Three Mile Island Litig., 95 F.R.D. 164
REV.
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tion of defective products occur in many different places and at
various times. The same defective product may cause injuries to a
large group of consumers, 5 or a large group of workers may be in6
jured as a result of contact with toxic products.
In recent years, both lawyers and nonlawyers have noted the
7
inefficiency and undue costs associated with mass tort litigation.
Some of these commentators predict that if mass tort cases are tried
on an individual basis in the future, they will cost hundreds of millions of dollars to litigate.8 The perceived inefficiencies, costs, and
delays associated with mass tort litigation have provoked calls for
(M.D. Pa. 1982) (nuclear reactor accident); Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 86
F.R.D. 476 (D. Vt. 1980) (water and air pollution); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85
F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980) (water pollution); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp.
354 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (coal dust nuisance); Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users'
Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 329, 576 P.2d 517 (1978) (property damage caused by water escaping
from canal); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Wollenmann, 180 Ind. App. 588, 390 N.E.2d 669
(gas tanker accident), reh'g denied, 180 Ind. App. 593, 392 N.E.2d 1000 (1979); Floyd v.
Philadelphia (No. 2), 8 Pa. D. & C.3d 380 (1978) (chlorine gas poisoning).
5 Mass product defect cases of this type include: Feinstein v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (defective tires); In re Northern Dist. of
Cal., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (defective intrauterine device), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983); In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 949 (.P.M.D.L.
1979) (defective vaccine); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (DES drug); Barr v. General Motors, 80 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (defective
automobile paint); Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 3d 150, 166 Cal. Rptr. 16
(1980) (defective cardiac pacemakers); Landesman v. General Motors, 42 Ill. App. 3d
363, 356 N.E.2d 105 (1976) (defective motor mount on cars), vacated, 72 Ill. 2d 44, 377
N.E.2d 813 (1978); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (defective intrauterine device), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301 (1978).
6
Mass product defect cases of this type include: Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (asbestos);Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d
Cir.) (radiation exposure), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (herbicide exposure during military service), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984).
7
See, e.g., Tydings, Air CrashLitigation: A JudicialProblem and a CongressionalSolution,
18 AM. U.L. REv. 299, 304 (1969) (arguing that present system results in unnecessarily
high costs and proposing expanded federal jurisdiction over aviation disaster cases and
new substantive federal tort law for such cases).
8
See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. Ruv. 851, 852-53 nn.4-5 (1984). The costs associated with
litigating tort cases are substantial when compared to the money actually paid to the
victims. See O'Connell, Bargainingfor Waivers of Third Party Tort Claims: An Answer to Product Liability Woesfor Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 435, 43839 (claimants ultimately receive only 37.5 cents of each premium dollar of products liability insurance as compensation for injuries); Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34
HASTINGS LJ. 871, 903 n.192 (1983) ("80 to 90 cents of every dollar spent in asbestos
ligitation is consumed by attorneys' fees and related legal expenses"); see, e.g., Wall. St.
J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (Manville Corporation reports that as of 1982 it had paid
$24.5 million in legal fees in connection with asbestos litigation, $24 million for injuries,
and $7.5 million for property damage).
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reform9 or for the increased use of such existingjoinder devices as
common question and limited fund class actions and the joint trial
of consolidated claims. 10
This Article examines the alternative devices presently available
for the joinder of related tort claims and discusses the extent to
which joinder is permissible and desirable in mass tort cases. The
Article first describes restrictions on the availability of various joinder alternatives in mass tort cases, as well as the availability and desirability of nonjoinder techniques such as informal coordination of
discovery and offensive collateral estoppel." It then focuses on the
undesirability of joining compensatory damage claims for trial because of the impact of this type ofjoinder on individual control of
claims and the fairness of the trial process. 12 Finally, the Article
weighs the desire for greater efficiency in mass tort cases against the
13
imperative of preserving fairness.
The balancing of efficiency versus fairness leads to the conclusion that the substantial damage claims of mass tort victims deserve
an uncompromised due process. Our judicial system should treat
the claims of the many victims of a major airplane crash or hotel fire
with as much care and sensitivity as it does the claim of the lone
victim of an automobile accident. The practice of ordering the joint
trial of common issues in mass tort cases involving substantial personal injuries or wrongful death claims should cease because it cannot be reconciled with this principle. 14 Although joint discovery on
common issues is desirable in most mass tort cases, 15 the joint trial
of such issues requires severing the common and noncommon issues, the use of special verdict forms, and the use of trial counsel
selected by the court rather than by individual plaintiffs. 16 These
procedures constitute substantial departures from those usually followed in simple tort cases and adversely affect the fairness of the
entire adjudicative process. The common question class action can
be a desirable joinder device in some mass tort cases, however, for
the limited purposes of structuring pretrial settlements and separately managing punitive damage claims. If carefully used, this type
of joinder can facilitate global settlements and the fair determina9

See, e.g., Tydings, supra note 7, at 310-18.

See infra notes 18 (advocating liberal use of common question class actions), 23
(advocating liberal use of limited fund class actions), and 141 (advocating joint trials).
I1 See infra § I.
12 See infra § II.
13 See infra § III.
14 See infra notes 229-53 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 254-92 and accompanying text.
10
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tion and equitable distribution of punitive damage awards. 1 7 Joinder in these circumstances facilitates the efficient management of
mass tort cases in a way that is fair to all litigants.
I
THE ALTERNATIVES OF JOINDER OR NONJOINDER IN MASS
TORT LITIGATION

Federal and most state rules of civil procedure permit several
types of joinder which might be used to cope with the special
problems associated with mass tort litigation. Three major types of
joinder have been used in mass tort cases: the common question
class action, the limited fund class action, and consolidation. Each
type has special advantages and disadvantages, but all are potentially available because a mass tort invariably raises questions of law
or fact which are common to the group of injured plaintiffs. Each
joinder device has already been used to manage some mass tort
cases, but each presents special difficulties that limit its usefulness.
Although many commentators advocate liberal use of common
question class actions in mass tort cases, 1 8 few trial judges have certified such proceedings.' 9 The reluctance of the courts to allow
17 See infra notes 313-16, 341-73 and accompanying text.
18 See 3BJ. MOORE &J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.45[3], at 353-54
n.40 (2d ed. 1984); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1783 (1972 & Supp. 1984); Fullam, FederalRule 23-An Exercise in Utility, 38J. AIR L. &
COM. 369, 377-78 (1972); Rheingold, Mass Disaster Litigation and the Use of Plaintiffs'
Groups, LITIGATION, Spring 1977, at 18; Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going,
Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1983); Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward
Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1227 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment,

FederalMass Tort]; Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1634-38
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Mass Accident]; Note, Class Actions and Mass Toxic
Torts, 8 COLUM. J. ENrL. L. 269, 285-89 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Toxic Torts];

Note, Class Actions in a Products Liability Context: The PredominationRequirement and Cause-inFact, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 860 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Predomination];Comment, FederalRules of Civil Procedure-Litigationof Mass Air Crashes-DistrictCourt's Power to
Certify and Conduct a Mass Accident Class Action Should Be Expanded to ConserveJudicial Time
and Energy, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 425, 450-51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment,Judiaal Time]; Note, The Products Liability Class Suit: Preventive ReliefFor the Consumer, 27 S.C.L.
REV. 229, 248-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preventive Relief]; Comment, Diethylstibestrol: Extension of Federal Class Action Procedures to Generic Drug Litigation, 14 U.S.F.L.
REV. 461, 479-80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Generic Drug].
19 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 723-28 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (common question class action for compensatory damages and limited fund class
action for punitive damages allowed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984); Bentkowski v.
Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401, 404-06 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (class action
approved on issue of negligence for ship passengers who were allegedly poisoned);
American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, 47 F.R.D. 155, 157-58 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (class action by exhibitors at convention site destroyed by fire upheld); Floyd v.
Philadelphia (No. 2), 8 Pa. D. & C.3d 380, 385-97 (1978) (class action allowed on liability for chlorine gas poisoning); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Wollenmann, 180 Ind. App. 588,
591-93, 390 N.E.2d 669, 671-73 (1979) (class action by persons who were evacuated
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such actions stems from the substantial obstacles which Federal
20
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 places in the way of the certification.
The rule's two most formidable requirements are that common
questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only
individual class members and that the common question class action
be superior to other methods available to adjudicate the
21
controversy.
The limited fund class action is appropriate only when the prosecution of separate tort claims creates a significant risk that damage
recoveries by some individual plaintiffs will "substantially impair or
22
impede" the ability of others to secure collectable judgments.
Over the objection of several commentators 23 courts have generally
refused to use the limited fund class action unless it is virtually certain that the assets of the defendant and his insurance coverage will
prove inadequate to satisfy the claims of all those the mass tort al24
legedly injured.
Consolidation of individual claims for pretrial purposes under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 is the form ofjoinder most often
used in mass tort cases in the federal courts. 2 5 Joinder by the confrom their homes after collision of trains carrying liquid propane allowed on issue of
liability).
20 See infra notes 45-78 and accompanying text.
21 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3). For a general discussion of the requirements for a common question class action, see infra notes 45-78 and accompanying text.
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). For a general discussion of the requirements for a
limited fund class action, see infra notes 79-123 and accompanying text.
23 Several commentators have urged the courts to freely use the limited fund class
action in order to manage mass tort litigation. See Comment, Federal Mass Tort, supra
note 18, at 1199; Note, Toxic Torts, supra note 18, at 282-83; Note, Class Certification in
Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1149-53 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Class Certification]; Note, Class Actions-Mass Accident Litigation, 40 J. AiR
L. & COM. 320, 330-32 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Mass Accident Litigation]; Comment, The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REv. 383, 403 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Use of Class Actions].
24
See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983) (error for lower court to
certify nationwide class of punitive damage claimants before it had sufficient evidence of
limited fund); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086
(9th Cir. 1975) (actions could not be maintained as class action because separate actions
would not alter rights of others with similar claims) (quoting LaMar v. H. & B. Novelty &
Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976)). But
compare In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 724-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(limited fund class action certified on punitive damage claims); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77
F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (limited fund class action for compensatory damages approved after supper club fire); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561
n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (limited fund class action for compensatory damages allowed in
admiralty proceeding in order to prevent prospective claimants from depleting fund).
25 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Strictly speaking, consolidation of separate claims in a
single proceeding does not result in thejoinder of those claims. Johnson v. Manhattan
Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933). Each claim retains its separate identity and each party
retains the right to prosecute his claim without having it merged into the claims of
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solidation of individual claims requires only that the cases present at
least one common question. 2 6 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation may transfer all related tort cases filed anywhere in the
federal system to a common venue by virtue of its authority to order
interdistrict venue transfers of related cases. 2 7 After transfer, the
transferee judge then consolidates the related cases pursuant to rule
28
42(a). The courts manage many mass tort cases on this basis,
although the propriety and desirability of allowing transferee judges
to order joint trial in the transferee forum after such transfers is
29
questionable.
The courts manage some mass tort cases by denying joinder
and leaving the plaintiffs free to bring their individual claims in any
available venue.30 In a small fraction of these cases the courts have
allowed plaintiffs to rely upon offensive collateral estoppel to help
establish their claims. 3 ' Although collateral estoppel is not a joinder device, it results in the resolution of common questions in a
consistent and efficient manner. Despite this similarity of result between offensive collateral estoppel andjoinder, the appropriateness
of using offensive collateral estoppel in mass tort cases remains
32
doubtful.
This section examines each of these joinder and nonjoinder
techniques to assess when they are permissible in mass tort cases
and what restrictions limit their availability.
A.

The Common Question Class Action
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended in 1966 to al-

others. See Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 1973). The parties to one
claim do not automatically become parties to the other consolidated claims. See McKenzie v. United States, 678 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1982). However, in mass tort cases
which are consolidated in a single venue, trial courts often allow litigants to proceed in
most significant respects as if the claims were joined. Thus, joint pretrial conferences
are encouraged, joint discovery is allowed, "lead" counsel may be appointed to represent the plaintiff group, and joint trials of common issues are permitted. See generally
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ .40, .50, 1.51, 1.52, 1.60, 1.92, 3.11, 4.12 (1982)
(discussing various situations in which consolidation may be used). Because consolidation of cases under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) is functionally equivalent to joinder of the
claims for most purposes, this Article will refer to consolidation as a type of joinder
device.
26 See 9 C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 2382, at 256.
27 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
28 See infra notes 138-39.
29 See infra notes 141-67 and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. at 1342 (bus crash); Oulette v. International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. at 483 (air pollution); Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., 107 Cal.
App. 3d at 154-57, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 18-20 (defective cardiac pacemakers).
31
See infra note 191.
32
See infra notes 186-205 and accompanying text.
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low common question class actions in the federal courts. 3 3 A majority of the states have since adopted statutes or rules allowing similar
common question class actions in state court.3 4 Subsections (a) and
(b) of rule 23 enumerate two sets of prerequisites for a common
question class action. 35 Subsection (a) of rule 23 enumerates the
first set of prerequisites. It requires that the class be so numerous
that simple joinder is impracticable, that there be questions of law
or fact common to the class, that the claims of the representative
parties be typical of the class, and that the representative plaintiffs
36
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
33 Prior to 1966, plaintiffs could bring related claims arising from a mass tort in
federal court as a class action exclusively under subsection (a)(3) of the original rule 23.
This permissive joinder device, termed a "spurious" class action, was rarely used in
mass tort litigation because the class suit could not conclusively determine the rights of

absent parties. See Note, ProceduralDevices for Simpljfying Litigation Stemming from a Mass
Tort, 63 YAIE LJ. 493, 513 (1954).
34 Thirty-six states have class action rules similar or identical to amended rule 23.
The remaining states follow a variation on the Field Code class action rule or have no
formal class action rule at all. See generally 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS

§ 1210b (current supp. 1984).
35 Diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy in excess of $10,000 are
required before a federal court may take subject matter jurisdiction over a common
question class action based solely on state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). These requirements rarely present an obstacle in mass tort cases for two reasons. First, in such cases
the citizenship of the plaintiff class is determined solely by the citizenship of the named
plaintiff representatives. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366
(1921). It is usually a simple matter to find a representative plaintiff diverse to all defendants. Second, although each individual class member's claim must exceed $10,000,
this requirement is also easily met in most personal injury cases. In some environmental
disaster cases where the plaintiff class has suffered only property damage, however, the
amount in controversy requirement may act as ajurisdictional bar to such claims in federal court. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
36

FED.

R. Civ. P. 23 provides:

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate fi-
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The requirements of rule 23(a) are usually satisfied in mass tort
nal injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is
to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by
a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include
all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the
class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the
court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining
the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2)
requiring, for the protection of the members of class or otherwise for the
fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action,
or of the proposed extent of thejudgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come
into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.
The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be
altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the pro-
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cases. The large number of plaintiffs present in such cases is normally sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement,3 7 and some
questions of fact common to the class inevitably exist.3 8 The typical39
ity and adequate representation prerequisites are closely related
and are satisfied if the attorneys representing the class are competent,40 if representative plaintiffs have sufficient resources to represent the class vigorously, and if the claims they assert are similar to
41
those of absent class members.
Two additional, implied prerequisites to the maintenance of a
common question class action are that there be an identifiable
43
class 4 2 and that the class representative be a member of the class.
These prerequisites generally are satisfied in mass tort class actions
for compensatory damages because identifying those persons allegedly injured by the mass tort is usually possible with reasonable
44
specificity and completeness.
1. Defining the Predominationand Superiority Tests
The second set of prerequisites prescribed by rule 23 creates
more formidable limitations on common question class actions in
mass tort cases. In subsection (b)(3), rule 23 requires that common
posed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class
in such manner as the court directs.
37
In order to meet rule 23(a)'s requirements, it is not necessary that joinder be
impossible, only that it be impracticable or inconvenient. See, e.g., Pabon v. McIntosh,
546 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (numerosity test is one of practicability ofjoinder involving subjective determination based upon number, expediency and inconvenience of trying individual suits); Smith v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 581 (D.
Md. 1979) (impossibility ofjoinder is not required-difficulty or impracticability will suffice); Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 33 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (joinder need not be
impossible).
38 See supra note 18.
39 See, e.g., Oullette v. International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. 476, 480 (D. Vt. 1980)
("the importance of the typicality requirement lies in assuring that the named plaintiffs
will adequately represent those who are unnamed"); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp.
1173, 1193 (E.D.N.Y.) ("the typical representative element in Rule 23(a)(3) is designed
to buttress the fair representation requirement in Rule 23(a)(4)"), aff'd on other grounds,
437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970), aft'd, 402 U.S. 991 (1971); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (court must be assured that representative will put up a "real
fight").
40 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (an "essential concomitant of adequate representation" is that attorney representing class is
"qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation").
41
See generally Developments in the Law--Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1471-98
(1976).
42
See, e.g., Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1348 (4th Cir. 1976) (definition of
the class is essential prerequisite to maintaining class action).
43
See, e.g., Long v. District of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("A
person simply cannot represent a class of which he is not a member.").
44 These implied prerequisites do pose special problems, however, in punitive damage class actions. See infra notes 344-50 and accompanying text.
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questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members. 45 It further requires that a common question class action be superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the cases. 46 In light of these prerequisites, the drafters of amended rule 23 concluded that mass accidents
would generally not give rise to issues suitable for litigation in a
common question class action. 47 The drafters reached this conclusion "because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only
of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would
degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried." 48
Many courts have relied on the drafters' comments to strictly
construe rule 23(b). These courts hold that if any of the liability
claims of the plaintiff class present actual issues not common to the
mass tort class, then certification should be denied. 49 These holdings set forth a view which constitutes both an oversimplification
and an overstatement. 50 Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the trial court
carefully balance all relevant factors, including the relative desirability or undesirability of alternative methods of adjudication, before
deciding whether to certify a common question class action.5 1 Rule
23(b)(3)'s "predomination" and "superiority" tests are interrelated
and mandate a comparison of the merits of various joinder and nonjoinder alternatives. Thus, a court's wooden reliance on a single
factor when deciding whether to certify the common question class
action is inadequate to meet the demands of rule 23.
Although rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions
predominate over questions affecting only individual class members,
most federal courts have not relied on a quantitative standard for
applying the predomination test.52 These courts have construed the
rule as calling for a pragmatic determination of whether common
questions represent a significant part of the liability issues presented
by the plaintiff class. 53 When at least one central issue relating to
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). For the full text of FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) see supra note 36.
46 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b); see also supra note 36.
47 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966).
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230, 233 (D.S.C. 1979) (court held that
because of individualized nature of proof, common questions of fact did not
predominate and motion for class certification should be denied).
50
See Williams, supra note 18, at 330 ("an argument that a single, unique issue

should foreclose certification entirely is both wholly disingenuous and overly
simplistic").
51 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
52 See 7A C. WRGrr & A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 1778, at 52.
53

id. § 1778, at 53.
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the defendant's liability is common to the class, the predomination
test may be satisfied, even though the remaining liability and damage issues may have to be tried separately. 54 Thus, the question is
neither whether there are quantitatively more common than noncommon questions, nor whether the amount of trial time devoted to
common questions will exceed that required for noncommon questions. 55 Instead, it is whether, on balance, the use of a common
question class action would be a fair, efficient and practical way in
56
which to proceed.
Both the text and drafters' comments of rule 23(b)(3) support
this pragmatic interpretation of the predomination requirement.
Rule 23(b)(3) expressly links the "predomination" test to the "superiority" test. The rule makes four factors relevant to the determination of whether both tests are satisfied:
The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
likely to be enclaims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
57
countered in the management of a class action.
Whether common questions predominate is thus in part a practical
question: whether in a particular case, the common question class
action is superior or inferior to other kinds ofjoinder or nonjoinder.
Moreover, amended rule 23's drafters strongly implied that a pragmatic interpretation of the predomination requirement was correct.
According to the drafters, the predomination test is part of rule
23(b)(3) because "[i]t is only where this predominance exists that
58
economies can be achieved by means of the class action device."
This further suggests that the courts should interpret rule 23(b)(3)
pragmatically and use it to screen out cases where a common question class action would be inefficient or unmanageable.
P

Id. § 1778, at 54.
55 See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D. Minn.
1968) (common questions concerning conspiracy sufficiently predominated to satisfy
predomination requirement despite claim that damages issues predominated over those
of conspiracy); see also Comment, FederalMass Tort, supra note 18, at 1210-11 (no clearly
defined procedure for measuring litigation time has yet been developed); 7A C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 1778, at 52 ("clockwatching is not very helpful in ascertaining whether class action treatment would be desirable in a particular case").
54

56

See A. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND

FUTURE 49 (1977).
57 FED. R. Civ.

58

P. 23(b)(3). See supra note 36 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23's full text).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes, 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966).
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Applying the Predomination and Superiority Tests

Although the litigation of the common questions on a class basis promises substantial efficiencies, applying the predomination test
in mass tort cases can prove difficult. In many mass tort cases, a
significant proportion of the liability issues cannot be adjudicated
on a class basis. For example, in the 1980 MGM hotel fire eighteen
persons died in the casino and on the lower levels of the hotel due
to the fire's close proximity and the toxic smoke and gases it released. Sixty-one other persons died in the stairways, corridors, elevators, or rooms located on the hotel's upper floors because of toxic
smoke and gases penetrating the Guest Tower from the fire's source
more than ten stories below. 59 The construction defects alleged to
have contributed to the loss of life varied both between these two
groups and among individuals in each group.60 Thus, the issue of
proximate causation, an essential element of a tort claim, 61 was not
a question common to all plaintiffs. 62 In other cases, the issues of
contributory negligence, comparative negligence, assumption of the
risk, and related affirmative defenses may also present factual ques63
tions unique to each plaintiff.

In some mass tort cases, the state law governing each individual
tort claim may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. This is particularly
true in mass product defect cases where the injuries suffered by the
individual plaintiffs may have occurred in many different states. The
recent trend towards choosing the applicable law based on which
state has the most substantial contact with the tort,64 rather than
59

See In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 915-16 (D. Nev. 1983).

Five other persons were moved before being pronounced dead. Id at 916.
60
Id.
61 See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (5th ed. 1984);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-61 (1965).
62
See also Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979) (issue of proximate
causation varied between plaintiffs in suit against drug manufacturer). Compare Payton v.
Abbott Labs., 100 F.R.D. 336, 338-39 (D. Mass. 1983) (decertifying mass product defect
common question class action in part because proof of enterprise liability of the defendant drug manufacturer required separate trials on issue of foreseeability for each plaintiff's claim).
63
See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1982) (mass tort action against nine different defendants not
proper for certification as a class action where defendants were taking different actions
at varying times), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566,
571 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (in product liability actions, use of particular affirmative defense
may depend on factual circumstances individual to each plaintiff's claim).
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 145 (1971). The relevant
factors in such a "contacts" analysis include: the place where the injury occurred, the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, the domicile or place of business
of the parties, and the center of the relationship between the parties. Id.
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simply where the injury occurred, 6 5 increases the likelihood, even in
mass disaster cases, that a variety of laws from different states will
66
control the various claims arising out of the same mass tort.
Differences among state laws on tort liability pose a greater obstacle to satisfying the pragmatic predomination test than do state
law variations concerning recoverable damages. Because individual
damage claims due to a mass tort vary from plaintiff to plaintiff, they
present noncommon issues that must be tried individually. As a result, differences among state laws regarding recoverable damages in
wrongful death and personal injury actions are insignificant because
the court can apply the appropriate law as it individually adjudicates
each plaintiff's damage claim. Far more significant are differences
among state laws concerning matters affecting liability. 6 7 Ignoring
differences among state laws in matters affecting liability, by applying a single legal standard in a federal common question class action, would affect the substantive rights of the parties in violation of
the Rules Enabling Act.68
In summary, many mass tort cases present both common and
noncommon liability questions. Consequently, determining
whether the common questions predominate in the pragmatic sense
intended by rule 23(b)(3) requires a careful evaluation of whether
the common question class action will prove superior to otherjoinder devices in providing a fair and efficient adjudication of the mass
tort.
Rule 23(b)(3) enumerates four factors pertinent to resolving
whether the common question class action will prove superior to
other joinder devices in a given case. 69 Rule 23(b)(3) first directs
the court to consider "the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate ac65

See RESTATEMENT

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

378 (1934); R.

WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-

TARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.1, at 266-67 (2d ed. 1980).

66 A federal court sitting in a diversity case must apply the conflict of laws principles
of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see also
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (following rule established in
Klaxon).
67 These issues include the plaintiff's burden of proof, the availability of certain
liability theories to the plaintiff (e.g., strict liability, res ipsa loquiter, last clear chance, and
enterprise liability), and the availability to the defendant of various affirmative defenses.
But see In re Asbestos School Litig., 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 8, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (rejecting
alleged conflicts between the law of 54 jurisdictions as a basis for denying a common
question class action in a mass product defect case). This decision may be challenged in
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Silas, Asbestos-free, 71 A.B.A. J. 22 (April
1985).
68 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). See infra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
69 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The drafters intended this list to be merely suggestive and not exhaustive. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 98,
104 (1966).
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tions. ' '70 This factor weighs heavily against certifying common
question class actions in most cases. 71 The rule next directs the
court to examine "the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class."' 72 This factor directs attention to evidence of interest by individual class members in controlling their own claims. Pending litigation may also reduce the efficiency gained through use of a class
action. 73 The third factor, "the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in a particular forum," 74 is important in mass tort cases for two reasons. First, the decision
whether to concentrate the litigation in one forum affects the degree
of individual control over individual claims. Second, concentration
may or may not be an efficient or logical way to manage the adjudication of the claims. 7 5 Finally, rule 23(b)(3) directs the court to contemplate "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action." 76 This factor isolates a key issue in
most mass tort cases because the special procedures the court must
use to manage such cases may result in unfairness or inefficiency. 7 7
Thus, the court's determination of whether the common question
class action will prove superior to other adjudicative modes will usually be based on a balancing of the adverse impact such a class action will have on the interest of individual plaintiffs in controlling
their own claims and the possible unfairness of a mass trial, against
the efficiencies possible through this type ofjoinder.
Applying this balancing test in mass tort litigation poses several
difficulties for the court. First, an individual's interest in controlling
the prosecution of his own claim for personal injuries is a long recognized, but intangible interest. 78 Weighing such intangible interR. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
See infra notes 229-53 and accompanying text.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
73
Pending litigation by class members is a strong indication of their interest in
individually controlling their own claims and of the likelihood that they would opt out of
any class action. See infra notes 229-53 and accompanying text. The existence of such
litigation also undermines the efficiencies possible through the use of a class action. 3B
J. MOORE &J. KENNEDY, supra note 18,
23.45 [4.-2], at 23-364.
74
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
75 See, e.g., Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(proposed class action in Virginia for personal injuries and wrongful death resulting
from the crash of an airplane in Bali, Indonesia, denied where only two of the 95 victims
had any connection with Virginia).
70
71
72

FED.

76

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).

77 Although it is possible in federal court to try some common liability issues on a
class basis and the remaining noncommon liability and damage issues on an individual
basis, it may be inefficient or undesirable to do so. See infra notes 263-92 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 207-53 and accompanying text. Predicting whether a large
number of class members will opt out of the class to regain individual control of their
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ests against litigation expenses saved through joinder is inherently
difficult. Second, the impact of mass trials on the fairness of the
process to individual litigants is likely to be substantial, but unpredictable. Finally, rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to assess whether,
as a relative matter, a common question class action is superior to
other types ofjoinder or to nonjoinder of the mass tort claims.
The final requirement that the court consider the relative merits of other devices makes clear that the balancing test requires a
comprehensive analysis of the merits of all available joinder or nonjoinder alternatives. The court must consider as part of its balancing process: (1) whether a limited fund class action is appropriate;
(2) whether the consolidation of the claims in a single forum for
joint discovery and joint trial is possible and desirable; and (3)
whether the cases should be allowed to proceed without any kind of
joinder on the assumption that offensive collateral estoppel may
permit the efficient and consistent adjudication of the common
questions presented in a mass tort case. Thus, before assessing the
relative desirability of common question class actions, it is necessary
to consider what limitations exist or should exist on other possible
types of joinder in mass tort cases and to examine the impact of
joinder on individual control of claims and the fairness of the trial
process.
B.

Limited Fund Class Action

In mass tort cases, a limited fund class action is proper in federal court (and in many state courts) 79 when two sets of requirements are met. First, the suit must fall within the threshold
requirements for a class action enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a).8 0 Second, the prosecution of separate actions by
each of the plaintiffs must "create a risk of. . .adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest." 8' Thus, a limited fund class action may
claims, thereby destroying the utility of the class action, is also an inherently speculative
task. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
79
Of the 36 states which have class action rules similar or identical to FED. R. Civ.
P. 23, all but four allow limited fund class actions analogous to those permitted by FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). See supra note 34.
80 See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
81 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). The mere possibility that one plaintiff may lose his
claim for damages against the defendant with stare decisis effects in later cases brought
by other plaintiffs does not justify certification of a limited fund class action. See Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1181 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affd, 431 U.S. 864
(1977); La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973); Pruitt v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 108 (E.D. Va. 1980). But see Note, Class Certification,
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be proper if the defendant may be unable to satisfy all of the damage claims brought against him due to insufficient assets or legal
82
limitations on total liability.
This type ofjoinder protects the interests of all claimants to the
limited fund by preventing its disbursal on a first-come, first-served
basis. 83 The rule compels complete joinder of the class and no
member may excuse himself.8 4 Thus, the court can protect the limited fund from premature distribution and distribute it to successful
85
claimants on an equitable basis.
Although courts have permitted limited fund class actions in a
wide variety of cases, 86 very few have allowed this type of compulsory joinder in mass tort cases. 8 7 The courts have refused to use
this type ofjoinder liberally in mass tort litigation even though such
cases often involve numerous plaintiffs asserting large claims 88
against defendants whose vulnerable financial condition sometimes
makes doubtful their ability to pay future judgments. The proper
standard for determining whether the court should allow a limited
fund class action is whether a reasonable likelihood exists that the
plaintiffs' claims will exceed the defendants' available assets. Other
tests for determining the propriety of such limited fund class actions
are less satisfactory than this standard.
supra note 23, at 1155-57 (arguing that stare decisis should be sufficient basis for certifying limited fund class action).
82 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 101 (1966); A.
MILLER, supra note 56, at 45.
83 See In re Federal Skywalk

Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other
grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Coburn v. 4-R Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977), mandamus denied sub nom. Union Light, Heat & Power
Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913
(1979).
84
In a federal class action, class members may only opt out of a 23(b)(3) class. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Members of a 23(b)(1)(B) class are prohibited from opting out and,
if adequately represented, are bound by the class action judgment. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(3); see 7A C. WRiGrr & A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 1789, at 171.
85 Courts may distribute a limited fund to plaintiffs on a pro rata basis. See, e.g., In
re Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. at 485; Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 69, 618
P.2d 1268, 1273 (1980). In mass tort cases, however, courts should initially distribute
the fund based on the compensatory damage awards obtained by the plaintiffs. Only if
the limited fund is not exhausted by such payments should it be used to satisfy any
punitive damage awards against the defendant. The plaintiffs have no equitable entitlement to receive such awards commensurate with their right to compensation for their
injuries. See infra note 361.
86
See 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 34, § 1140; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
18, § 1774, at 15-18.
87
See supra note 16 (citing cases).
88
The plaintiffs in the FederalSkywalk Cases, for example, filed claims which totalled
over $1 billion in compensatory damages and $500 million in punitive damages. 680
F.2d at 1187 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The Dalkon Shield case involved 1,573 suits with
claims for compensatory damages exceeding $500 million and punitive damages of over
$2.3 billion. 526 F. Supp. at 893.
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At the one extreme, the standard advanced by the Ninth Circuit
would restrict limited fund class actions in mass tort cases to those
instances where individual actions "inescapably will alter the substance of the rights of others having similar claims." 89 This interpretation requires the deciding court to be far more certain that a
limited fund class action is necessary to avoid prejudice than was
intended by the authors of rule 23(b)(1)(B). 90 The Ninth Circuit's
interpretation also imposes a much stricter standard than that required for assessing the likelihood of prejudice under related joinder rules. 9 ' Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how a court can
establish "inescapable prejudice" without making a preliminary investigation into the merits of the case so detailed as to violate Eisen
92
v. Carlisle &Jacquelin's prohibitions.
At the other extreme, some courts and commentators urge that
limited fund class actions be allowed merely upon a showing that
the plaintiffs' claims might exceed the defendant's assets. 93 This interpretation of rule 23(b)(1)(B) is incorrect for several reasons.
First, it ignores the drafters' belief that use of the limited fund class
action is proper only when the risk of prejudice without such an action is "probable." 94 In the absence of a requirement that prejudice
be probable before the court may certify the limited fund class action, numerous plaintiffs could force such joinder simply by using
inflated ad damnum clauses. 95 Further, a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice is the minimum showing necessary to justify the loss of
individual control over claims that a limited fund class action inevi96
tably entails.
89

In re Northern Dist. of Cal., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d

847, 851 (9th Cir.) (defective intrauterine device), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.
1975) (quoting La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466-67 (9th Cir.

1973)) (air crash), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
90 See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
91
See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
92
417 U.S. 156 (1974). See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (discussing
Eisen in more detail).
93
See Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977) ("total judgments
might substantially exceed the ability of the defendants to respond") (emphasis added),
mandamus denied sub nom. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 588
F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel
Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1973) ("[a]lthough it is unlikely that an aggregation of the claims of the passengers will exceed the value of the vessel "Skyward"
the theoretical possibility exists"), aJfd, 507 F.2d 1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1975); Comment,
FederalMass Tort, supra note 18, at 1200-01.
94
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 101 (1966).
95 See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979); Pruitt v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 476, 478 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789-90 (1980), reh'g denied, 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
96
See infra notes 207-53 and accompanying text.
Although some commentators have championed the liberal use of the limited fund
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1. The Proper Standard
The standard for certification of a limited fund class action
under rule 23(b)(1)(B) in a mass tort case should be whether a reasonable likelihood exists that the plaintiffs' claims will exceed the
defendant's available assets. 97 Under this standard, a court must be
reasonably satisfied that the plaintiffs' liability claims are substantial,
that the plaintiffs' damage claims are not frivolous or exaggerated,
and that the defendant's available assets are, in fact, limited. Only
after the court has concluded that these conditions, as well as the
prerequisites of rule 23(a), have been met, should it certify a limited
fund class action.
This proposed standard is consistent with analogous joinder
rules. The text of these rules reveals a common concern with prejudice to individuals not before the court. 98 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) allows
class certification if individual adjudication "would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests . . . -99 Rule 19(a)(2)(i) requires the
joinder of a party who "claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may (i)
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest ... ."100 Rule 24(a)(2) likewise permits an individual to intervene as of right in an action "when the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
class action, they have done so without carefully considering the very special and limited
circumstances in which suchjoinder is appropriate. See Seltzer, PunitiveDamages in Mass
Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
37, 83 (1983); Note, Class Certification,supra note 23, at 1143; Comment, FederalMass Tort,
supra note 18, at 1199-1209; Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1787, 1808-10 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, PunitiveDamages].
97
Several federal judges have suggested the use of a similar standard. Judge Weinstein asserted that to justify a limited fund class action, there must be a "substantial
probability" that awarded damages will exceed the defendant's assets. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom.
In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1417
(1984). Judge Heaney, dissenting in In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188
(8th Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982), posited that a "significant likelihood that ... damage awards may exhaust" the defendants' available assets
justified a limited fund class action. Accord, In re Asbestos School Litig., 40 Fed. R. Serv.
2d 8, 21-22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Other courts have declined to certify limited fund class
actions in mass tort situations because evidence of the defendants' "likely" insolvency
was not offered. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979)
(court stated that numerous plaintiffs and large ad damnum clause by themselves do not
guarantee certification).
98
See FED. R. Civ. P. 19; FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
99
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
100 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
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may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest ..
."101 The obvious textual similarities between these
rules reflect the intention of their authors that they be construed
consistently. Thus, the Advisory Committee stated in its note following rule 23 that the considerations stated under rule 23(b)(1)(A)
and rule 23(b)(1)(B) are comparable to the elements of rule
19(a)(2)(i) and 19(a)(2)(ii). 10 2 Rules 24(a)(2) and 19(a)(2)(i) are
linked in a similar fashion in the Committee's note on the 1966
amendments to rule 24.103
The standard proposed here is consistent with the quantum of
possible prejudice needed to warrant intervention of right under
rule 24(a)(2), or dismissal for lack of an indispensable party under
rule 19(a)(2)(i).' 0 4 Among those consistently found to be indispensable parties under rule 19 are all persons who have potentially conflicting claims to a particular fund. 10 5 Although the limited nature
of the fund must be established to the court's satisfaction, the danger of prejudice need not be certain. The plaintiffs' claims against
the fund need only be potentially prejudicial to one another; conflict
may be found between asserted claims and not just proven
claims.10 6 Similarly, under rule 24 (a) (2) intervention may be had as
of right when asserted claims may exceed the available fund, consti10 7
tuting a potential source of prejudice to the absent claimants.
R. CIrv. P. 24(a)(2).
R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100 (1966).
103
Id. at 110.
104
Compare cases cited supra note 24 with cases cited in 3AJ. MOORE &J. KENNEDY,
supra note 18, § 19.08, at 19-186-87 (1982) (claimants to limited fund are indispensable
parties under rule 19) and 3BJ. MOORE &J. KENNEDY, supra note 18, § 24.07 [3], at 2464 (1982) (party has right to intervene "when recovery in the main action would deplete
a fund so as to jeopardize satisfaction of the intervenor's claim").
105 See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737-38 (1977) (among interests traditionally supporting compulsory joinder of absent plaintiffs is interest of such
plaintiffs in recovering portion of fund allocable to them); Johnson v. Middleton, 175
F.2d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 1949) ("all persons having conflicting claims to a particular fund
are indispensible parties to its disposition"); Fitzgerald v. Jandreau, 16 F.R.D. 578, 580
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) ("Where the purpose of a suit is the disposition of a fund, to which
there are several claimants, all of the claimants are generally indispensible.").
106
The plaintiffs' claims in the cases cited supra note 105 were asserted claims.
None was reduced to judgment or otherwise shown to be a sum-certain. The authors of
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i) stated that the clause was intended to protect "the person
whose joinder is in question against the practical prejudice to him which may arise
through a disposition of the action in his absence." FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 89, 91 (1966) (emphasis added).
107
See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Environs Dev. Corp., 601 F.2d 851, 858-59 (5th Cir.
1979); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, 497 F.2d 957, 958 (8th Cir. 1974); Diaz
v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878
(1970), reh'g denied, 400 U.S. 1025 (1971); Hardy-Latham v. Wellons, 415 F.2d 674, 676
(4th Cir. 1968); FrankJ. Delmont Agency, Inc. v. Graff, 55 F.R.D. 266, 268 (D. Minn.
1972).
101

FED.

102

FED.
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Moreover, cases interpreting rule 24(a)(2) have not required that
either the claims or the fund be a sum-certain.' 08 The common purpose uniting these joinder rules is to avoid having a race to the
courthouse determine the actual recovery of damages. 10 9
2.

Application of the ProperStandard

There are two ways in which the plaintiffs' recovery fund may
be limited in mass tort cases. First, a statutory or other legal ceiling
may restrict the amount of damages a defendant is obligated to pay.
Second, the defendant's assets and insurance coverage may limit the
recovery fund. A fund defined by statute may be either a fixed or an
indefinite amount. The fund available in the event of a nuclear accident under the Price-Anderson Act,10 for example, is a specific
amount." When a fund has no legal limit, discovery of the defendant's available assets and insurance coverage permits an informed
estimate of the size of the available fund. In addition to evidence
regarding the dollar value of the defendant's resources, the court
should consider information regarding the defendant's future financial viability. If a company is financially threatened for reasons unrelated to the litigation before the court, the court must assess the
likelihood that the outside threat will drain the defendant's assets.1 12 In addition, the court should consider the often substantial
13
costs of the mass tort litigation itself.'
When determining whether it is reasonably likely that the plaintiffs' claims will exceed the defendant's assets and sojustify a limited
fund class action, the court (or a special master appointed by the
court) 114 should conduct a limited preliminary hearing and receive
108 See supra note 107.
109 Compare Frank J. Delmont Agency, Inc. v. Graff, 55 F.R.D. 268 (intervention of
right allowed to avoid race to courthouse between claimants to fund) with Johnson v.
Middleton, 175 F.2d at 537 (indispensible parties under FED. R. Civ. P. 19 are those with
conflicting claims to particular funds); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. at 45 (class action
allowed to avoid race to courthouse with "monetary prizes for a few winners and worthless judgments for the rest").
110 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1982).
111 The statute provides a fund of $500 million plus "the amount of financial protection required of the licensee or contractor." 42 U.S.C. § 22 10(e) (1982). A limited fund
may also arise in admiralty cases where by statute the fund available to satisfy wrongful
death and personal injury claims against a ship owner consists of the value of the ship
owner's interest in the vessel and freight. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976).
112 Nontort claimants, as well as fellow class members bringing separate claims, can
adversely affect a plaintiff's interest in a share of the defendant's assets. The probability
of circumstances beyond the certification court's control depleting the assets affects the
likelihood that the claims will exceed the defendant's assets.
113 At the time it filed for bankruptcy, for example, the Manville Corporation had
paid $24.5 million in regal fees, $24 million for injuries, and $7.5 million for property
damage. See Wall St.J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
114
See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
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evidence to determine the probability that the plaintiffs will succeed
in establishing the defendant's liability and to make a fair estimate
of the plaintiffs' provable compensatory damages. 11 5 Preliminary
hearings of this type do not run afoul of the Supreme Court's ruling
in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin.116 In Eisen, the Court rejected a pretrial hearing to allocate the cost of notifying absent class members
in a common question class action. The Court stated that "nothing
in either the language or history of Rule 23 . . . gives a court any
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in
order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. '" 117 A court, however, may examine whether the requirements
of rule 23(a) and (b) have been fulfilled. If the pleadings are found
to be insufficient, a court may order appropriate discovery and hold
an evidentiary hearing in order to make an informed certification
decision. 1 18 The procedure for certification in limited fund cases
recommended here is thus well within the proscriptions of Eisen and
1 19
has been used in several mass tort cases.
The objection that such preliminary hearings will interfere with
the right to trial by jury is without merit. A mass tort plaintiff need
not obtain a judgment against the defendant before the court will
certify a limited fund class action. 120 That the judge and not the
115 See In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984) (failure
to hold evidentiary hearing and to make findings of fact concerning the probable existence of limited fund in mass product defect case requires that writ of mandamus issue
directing district court to vacate its order certifying limited fund class action). In other
contexts federal courts make similar preliminary determinations routinely. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to hold a preliminary hearing
to determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction. FED. R. Civ. P. 65. The decision
to issue a preliminary injunction is based in part on an assessment of whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits at trial. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
931 (1975).
116 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
117 Id. at 177.
118 See, e.g., Bradford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 673 F.2d 792, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1982)
(hearing is usually necessary when there is serious question about element of certification); Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers, Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890,
895 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing discovery to aid in determining whether certification was
appropriate), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); International Woodworkers v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 568 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1977) (when pleadings are inconclusive, parties
must have opportunity to discover and present evidence concerning propriety of certification); Marcera v. Chinlund, 565 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs should have
opportunity to present evidence before court decides to deny certification).
119 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.RD. 718, 725-27
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (special master held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to
certify a limited fund class action) mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984); Pruitt v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 107-08 (E.D. Va. 1980) (court held evidentiary hearing to
decide whether to certify class action).
120 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 101 ("A class action by
or against representative members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or in
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jury distributes the individual plaintiff's ultimate recovery does not
violate any party's right to trial by jury. Once the jury or juries decide the liability and damage issues, it is the judge's responsibility to
develop a plan for the fund's distribution.1 2 1 Such a division of duties does not interfere with the jury's factfinding mission and is com22
patible with historic practice.'
In mass tort cases the proper prerequisite to a limited fund
class action for compensatory damages is a showing that there is a
"reasonable likelihood" that the plaintiffs' claims will exceed the defendant's available assets. This standard limits the mandatory joinder of all plaintiffs in federal court, and the resulting injunction
against any ongoing state judicial proceedings involving related
claims, 123 to those few cases where a genuine threat of prejudice to
class members justifies forcing joinder.
C.

Consolidation for Joint Discovery and Joint Trial

In the past, courts have usually rejected the use of common
question and limited fund class actions in mass tort cases. Consequently, federal and state courts have managed a large number of
mass tort cases by employing consolidation techniques which permit
coordination of pretrial discovery and, in some cases, joint trial of
some or all of the related claims.' 24 The prerequisite for consolidation of mass tort claims is a single common question of law or
groups,followed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim and proportionate
distribution of the fund, meets the problem.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Under this procedure, the plaintiffs' claims remain uncertain until after the class portion
of the suit is concluded.
121
See, e.g., Pan Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474,483 (E.D. La.
1960) (interpleader fund).
122
See IJ. POMEROY, EOUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 407 (4th ed. 1918). The equitable
distribution of a limited fund usually will be a mechanical process by which the jury
verdicts are reduced to percentages of the available assets.
123 In In re Federal Skywalk Cases, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit held that a
federal limited fund class action that would result in an injunction against further proceedings in pending state court cases arising out of the same mass tort, violated the
federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). 680 F.2d 1181-83 (8th Cir. 1982).
Where a reasonable likelihood of a limited fund exists, a court must exercise control
over the fund in order to prevent its inequitable distribution. In such circumstances, the
federal Anti-Injunction Act does not prevent the court from enjoining state judicial proceedings because such an injunction is necessary "in aid of its jurisdiction" over the
limited fund. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. See In re Asbestos School Litig., 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 8,
22 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (punitive damages limited fund class action in federal court does not
violate Anti-Injunction Act). If the Anti-Injunction Act is construed in future cases, as it
was in the Federal Skywalk Cases, to prohibit federal injunctions against pending state
judicial proceedings in mass tort limited fund class actions, then the possible usefulness
of this joinder device in such cases will be largely compromised. See Wright & Colussi,
The Successful Use of the Class Action Device in the Management of the Skywalks Mass Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REv. 141, 149 (1984).
124
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 138-39.
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fact;' 2 5 the consolidated claims need not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.' 26 The court may order consolidation of
claims for pretrial proceedings only, for joint trial of the common
issues only, or forjoint trial of all issues.1 2 7 In making this decision,
the court has broad discretion to decide whether consolidation
would be desirable because it would avoid unnecessary inconvenience, delay, or prejudice.' 28 The consent of the parties to consolidation is not required.' 2 9 In simple tort cases, the consolidation of
actions by different plaintiffs arising out of the same tort is
30
common.1
Actions pending in different judicial districts in the federal
court system cannot be immediately consolidated under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42.131 Consolidation is possible only if the
related cases are all filed in or transferred to a single federal district.
Courts often use the possibility of consolidation to justify a change
of venue order.' 3 2 In the federal courts, venue transfers may be ordered in two ways. First, the district court in which the action is filed
may transfer the case in its entirety to another district for the convenience of the parties and the witnesses, or in the interest of justice.' 3 3 This approach has proven of little value in achieving the
consolidation of mass tort cases in a single venue because it requires
125
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 42; IowA R. Civ. P. 185; MICH. GEN. CT. R. 505.1; MINN.
R. Civ. P. DIsT. CT. 42.01; Mo. R. Civ. P. 66.01(b). These state rules allow consolidation of claims filed within a single state judicial district. Few states provide for the transfer of cases from one state judicial district to another, although some state judges may
assert that they have an inherent power over judicial administration which includes the
power to order consolidation of common issue cases. See Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failureof Nonparty Preclusion and an Alternative Proposal, 67 IowA L. REV.
917, 964 (1982).
126 See Shacter v. Richter, 271 Minn. 87, 135 N.W.2d 66 (1965).
127 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 2382-83, at 257-59. See generally
Comment, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 373 (1963) (discussing
problem of using FED. R. Civ. P. 42 to achieve consolidation in mass tort cases).
128
See Mutual Life Ins. Co. y. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1892); American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Fair (Inc.), 35 F.R.D. 236, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
129 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 293; Kershaw v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 415 F.2d 1009, 1012 (5th Cir. 1969).
130
See, e.g., Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d at 1012 (multiple party defective drug case); Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1965) (multiple party
automobile accident); Plough v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 172 F.2d 396, 397 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 940 (1949) (multiple party railroad accident).
131
See Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1962).
State consolidation rules typically allow only the consolidation of claims filed within a
single judicial district. See supra note 125. But see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404-404.8
(West 1973 & Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. § 805.05(1)(b) (1977).
132
See, e.g., Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968).
133
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982).
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the unanimous cooperation of all transferor judges to effect complete consolidation.
In the alternative, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
("MDL Panel") may order transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 when (1)
civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, (2) the transfer will promote the just
and efficient conduct of individual suits, and (3) the transfer will be
for the convenience of parties and witnesses. 134 Different damage
claims and liability theories of individual plaintiffs will not prevent
transfer of several actions to a single venue under section 1407.135
Similarly, the MDL Panel may order transfer even though the transferred actions involve different parties and issues.1 3 6 The MDL
Panel may order transfer on its own motion or that of any party, and
13 7
it may issue such an order even if all parties are opposed to it.
The MDL Panel has ordered the transfer of related federal cases in
many mass disaster' 3 8 and some product defect' 39 cases. Where the
134
Id. § 1407(a). See generally Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict
Litigation, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1001, 1002-17 (1974).
135
See In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 648, 649
(J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Air Crash Disaster in the Ionian Sea on Sept. 8, 1974, 438 F.
Supp. 932, 934 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
136
See In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 969, 974 (J.P.M.D.L.
1979); In re Celotex Corp. "Technifoam" Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 1077, 107879 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
See In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp.
137
906, 910 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
138
As ofJuly 1984, the MDL Panel, using its powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, had
transferred to a common venue cases brought in connection with 78 air disasters and 17
other mass disasters. Letter from Clerk, MDL Panel, to Roger H. Trangsrud (July 20,
1984) (with attachments) (on file with the author). Although the MDL Panel originally
published most of its transfer orders, it has recently released comparatively few for publication. Id. For examples of transfers made in mass disaster cases see In re Air Disaster
at Denver, Colo., on Nov. 16, 1976, 486 F. Supp. 241 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980); In re Air Crash
Near Van Cleve, Miss., on Aug. 13, 1977, 486 F. Supp. 926 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980); In re Air
Crash at Schenley Golf Course, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Aug. 21, 1977, 510 F. Supp. 1228
(J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Continental Grain Co., 482 F. Supp. 330 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979)
(grain elevator explosion); In re Oil Spill by "Amoco Cadiz" off the Coast of Fr. on Mar.
16, 1978, 471 F. Supp. 473 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Santa Cruz
Airport, Bombay, India, on Jan. 1, 1978, 463 F. Supp. 158 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Helicopter Crash Near Marsh Island, La., on Dec. 8, 1977, 461 F. Supp. 675 (J.P.M.D.L.
1978); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport in Denver, Colo., on Aug. 7,
1975, 447 F. Supp. 1071 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Air Crash Disaster at Taipei Int'l Airport onJuly 31, 1975, 433 F. Supp. 1120 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In re Amtrack Train Derailment at Frankewing, Tenn., on Oct. 1, 1975, 431 F. Supp. 916 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands, on Mar. 27, 1977, 435 F. Supp. 927
(J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Natchitoches Parish, La., on Sept. 20,
1973, 407 F. Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976); In re Radiation Incident at Wash., D.C., on
Apr. 5, 1974, 400 F. Supp. 1404 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In re Bomb Disaster at Roseville,
Cal., on Apr. 28, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1400 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In re Air Crash Disaster in
the Ionian Sea on Sept. 8, 1974, 407 F. Supp. 238 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974); In re Multidistrict
Litig. Arising From Silver Bridge Disaster, 311 F. Supp. 1345 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970).
139
As ofJuly 1984, the MDL Panel had transferred nine mass product defect cases
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questions of fact unique to each action, or group of actions in a single district, predominate, or where the actions are far advanced,
however, the MDL Panel has refused to transfer the actions to a
140
common venue.
1. Section 1407 Transfers Should Be For PretrialPurposes Only
Many courts and commentators have asserted that it is proper
in section 1407 cases for the transferee court to oversee not only
pretrial discovery concerning the transferred claims, but the trial as
well. 14 1 This view does not comport with legislative intent 142 and is
undesirable as a matter of policy in most mass tort cases. 14 3 Section
1407 explicitly states, and its legislative history confirms, that the
transferred case should remain with the transferee court for pretrial
purposes only and must be remanded back to the transferor court
for trial. In nearly all reported cases on the subject, however, the
courts have held that a transferee court may transfer the case to itself for trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), asserting that this practice is
consistent with both the text of section 1407 and its legislative history. 14 4 The reasoning in these cases is demonstrably wrong.
to a common venue. See Letter from Clerk, MDL Panel, supra note 138. See, e.g., In re
Richardson-Merrell Inc., "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 533 F. Supp. 489
(J.P.M.D.L. 1982) (drug), vacated, 582 F. Supp. 890 (J.P.M.D.L. 1984); In re Cutter Labs.,
Inc. "Braunwald-Cutter" Aortic Heart Valve Prods. Liab. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 1295
(J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (prosthetic heart valves); In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 464
F. Supp. 969 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (truck wheels); In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic "Cleocin"
Prods. Liab. Litig., 450 F. Supp. 1168 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978) (drug); In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 446 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978) (vaccinations); In re A.H.
Robins Co. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 540 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975)
(intrauterine device); In re Celotex Corp. "Technifoam" Prods. Liab. Litig., 68 F.R.D.
502 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975) (plastic insulation); In re Aviation Prods. Liab. Litig., 347 F. Supp.
1401 (.P.M.D.L. 1972) (commercial helicopter engines).
140 See, e.g., In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.
Supp. 906, 910 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
141 See infra note 144; see also Weigel, TheJudicialPanelon MultidistrictLitigation, Transferor Courts, and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 581 (1978) (transfer for trial permissible
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982)).
142
See infra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
143 See infra notes 245-53, 263-92 and accompanying text.
144 Two courts of appeals and the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation have
approved the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) by a transferee judge to retain a case for trial.
See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1156 (1983); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Bristol
Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litig., 424 F. Supp. 504, 507 J.P.M.D.L. 1976);
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 11 (b), 78
F.R.D. 561, 569 (1978). Although the MDL Panel has approved of this practice in rule
11 (b), any rules it promulgates which are "inconsistent with Acts of Congress" are invalid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1982). To the extent that rule 11(b) purports to confer
powers on transferee courts not intended by Congress, it is invalid. See von Kalinowski,
The Power of a TransfereeJudge to Transfer Liability and Damages Trial, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM.
197, 203 (1972). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have noted the use of § 1404(a) by
transferee courts but have not decided whether such use is proper. See In re Air Crash
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Section 1407(a) specifically requires the MDL Panel to remand
each action to its original district at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings. "Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the
[MDL P]anel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated ..
,,.145 The use of the imperative
phrase "shall be remanded" in this context is significant when compared with the language used to describe the MDL Panel's power to
transfer actions for consolidated pretrial proceedings. The first sentence of section 1407(a) states that "[w]hen civil actions involving
one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred."' 4 6 Section 1407(b) similarly
provides that "upon request of the panel, a circuit judge or a district
judge may be designated and assigned [and] . . . such actions may be assigned by the panel."' 4 7 Section 1407(c) states that "[p]roceedings
for the transfer of an action under this section may be initiatedby-(i)
the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation."' 148 In every reference
to transfer, the use of "may" in section 1407 demonstrates that the
MDL Panel has discretion to choose appropriate cases and appropriate transferee judges. Once pretrial proceedings are completed,
however, section 1407 provides that these cases "shall be remanded." The MDL Panel has no choice but to order remand of
these cases.
Despite the statute's plain language, most transferee courts
have concluded that they are not obligated to remand section 1407
cases. 149 The language of section 1407(a) implies, however, that the
"

Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977);
Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975). A few early cases took a different view of the transferee court's use of § 1404(a).
One court stated that the function of the transferee judge was to handle the pretrial
proceedings so that, upon remand, the transferor judge could try the case "expeditiously to the benefit of all parties to the litigation." In re Multidistrict Private Civil
Treble Damage Antitrust Litig. Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip.,
52 F.R.D. 398, 402 (C.D. Cal.1970). Another stated that the intent of § 1407 is that
cases "be returned to the courts of their inception at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings ....
Although experience with the Multidistrict Litigation Act suggests that return
is often unnecessary in practice, transferee courts are obliged to consider [the intent of
section 1407] in decision making." In re Career Academy Antitrust Litig., 57 F.R.D.
569, 571 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Later courts, however, have decided that the remand provision of § 1407 does not apply to them, and they retain all powers to transfer under
§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a).
145 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
146
Id. (emphasis added).
147 Id. § 1407(b) (emphasis added).
148
Id. § 1407(c) (emphasis added).
149
E.g., Pfizer v. Lord, 447 F.2d at 124; In re Viatron Computer Syss. Corp., 86
F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1980); see also Weigel, supra note 141, at 581 & nn.42-43 (citing
cases).
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transferee judge has no authority to keep the cases for trial.
Although section 1407 does not explicitly subordinate the transferee judge to the MDL Panel's power to remand, the MDL Panel
cannot remand unless it has the power to take cases away from the
transferee judge. Section 1407(a) explicitly requires the MDL Panel
to remand the case at the close of pretrial proceedings. It thus implicitly requires transferee judges to allow the MDL Panel to remand. Most transferee courts, however, have concluded that they
are under no such obligation, because section 1407 does not explicitly require them to remand transferred cases. 150
The legislative history of section 1407 buttresses the plain command of that statute that transferred cases must be remanded to the
transferor court for trial. Congress expressly stated its belief that
"subsection [1407(a)] requires that transferred cases be remanded
to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in
the consolidated proceedings."' 15 1 The legislative history does not
refer exclusively to the MDL Panel; it states simply that section 1407
requires that transferred cases be remanded. The transferee court
must cooperate with the MDL Panel in regard to remand.
The legislative history details four reasons for limiting the
transferee court's duties to pretrial proceedings. First, the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts, which originally drafted section 1407, had experience
only with pretrial transfers. The committee decided to keep the
proposal within the scope of its experience.' 5 2 Second, parties and
witnesses generally prefer trial in the original district. 15 3 Third, it
may prove impracticable for one court to try all the cases in a mass
tort litigation. 15 4 Fourth, most mass tort cases require local discovery in the transferor district in addition to coordinated discovery in
the transferee district. 155 Indeed, when Congress passed section
1407 it was "presumably mindful of the deference traditionally accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum."' 156 These reasons demonstrate Congress's intent that transferee courts remand transferred
cases at the close of pretrial proceedings. They make clear why
See cases cited supra note 149.
See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); see also S.
90th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1967).
152 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 151, at 4-5.
150
151

153

Id.

154

Id.
Id.

155

REP.

No. 454,

156 Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1970); see also
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (plaintiff's choice of forum should
not be disturbed absent compelling countervailing considerations).
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transferee courts lack discretion to retain such cases under section
1407(a).
A motion to transfer venue under section 1404(a) 15 7 is a pretrial motion. Many transferee courts 15 8 have ordered a transfer for
trial based on their power over "pretrial proceedings."'' 5 9 This interpretation is incorrect for three reasons. First, the House Report
states that pretrial proceedings:
generally involve deposition and discovery, and, of course, are
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., rule
16 and rules 26-37. Under the Federal Rules the transferee district court would have authority to render summary judgment, to
control and limit pretrial proceedings, and to impose sanctions
160
for failure to make discovery or comply with pretrial orders.
A motion to transfer under section 1404(a) is not related to discovery procedures and is not part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Congress intended that any power of the transferee judge to
make legal rulings be an adjunct to the discovery process, a practical
necessity to factual discovery.' 6 1 Even if the powers listed in the
legislative history are not exclusive, section 1404(a) is of an entirely
different nature than the powers which are mentioned. Thus, section 1404(a) should not be implicitly included in the general outline
of powers falling within the transferee court's authority over pretrial
proceedings. If Congress had intended to confer a power of this
nature upon transferee courts, it would have done so directly and
explicitly.
Second, the contention that the definition of "pretrial proceedings" includes a motion to transfer under section 1404(a) cannot be
reconciled with the various sections of the House Report which explicitly state that all cases will be remanded. Only three paragraphs
before the definition of "pretrial proceeding" noted above, the
House Report states: "The proposed statute affects only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It would not affect the place of
trial in any case . .. . 162 Although the use of section 1407 itself
does not directly affect the place of trial, without it the transferee
court would never have the opportunity to transfer the case to itself
157 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). This section provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
158 See cases cited supra note 144.
159 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (1982).
160 H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 151, at 3.
See MultidistrictLitigation: Hearingson S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
161
JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1966) (statement of Dean Phil C. Neal); id. at 21-22 (statement ofJudge William H. Becker).
162 H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 151, at 3.
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under section 1404(a). Allowing a section 1404(a) motion to be included in the definition of "pretrial proceeding," therefore, controverts the limitations Congress intended to place on section 1407
transfers. In order for the application of section 1407 to remain
logically consistent with legislative intent, the transferee court
should not retain transferred cases for trial under section 1404(a).
Third, 28 U.S.C. § 296, which allows interdistrict judicial assignments, 163 does not provide authority for the assertion that all of
the powers of a transferee judge are retained in a section 1407 proceeding. The Second Circuit in Pfizer v. Lord' 64 concluded that a
judge who is assigned under section 296 to oversee section 1407
proceedings may make section 1404 transfers because section 296
states that each "[section 296] judge shall have all the powers of a
judge of the court, circuit or district to which he is designated and
assigned." 165 According to the Second Circuit, if a section 296
judge could not make section 1404(a) transfers, then he would have
fewer powers than the other judges in the circuit or district.166 Fewer
powers, under section 296, would be illegal. But the Second Circuit's conclusion that the transferee judge would have fewer powers
is incorrect. Ajudge who is assigned a section 1407 proceeding has
the same powers as all -other similarly situated judges because all
section 1407 judges are forbidden to use section 1404(a). The Second Circuit is actually comparing the powers of a judge who is conducting section 1407 proceedings with a judge who is conducting
pretrial proceedings in a case originally filed in that district. But
section 296 does not call for a comparison of one type of case with
another. It compares one judge with another in the same district.
Because, theoretically, all of the judges in a circuit or district could
receive a section 1407 case in which section 1404(a) motions are
prohibited, all of the judges have the same powers. Because all
judges would be treated alike in this respect, a section 1407 transferee judge has "all the powers of a judge of the court, circuit or
67
district to which he is designated and assigned."'
28 U.S.C. § 296 (1982).
447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
165
28 U.S.C. § 296.
166 See Pfizer v. Lord, 447 F.2d at 124.
167
28 U.S.C. § 296 (1982). That consideration of § 1404(a) motions must wait until
remand, if the transferee court cannot consider them, comports with legislative intent.
Congress intended that § 1407 cases would be remanded to the transferor court for
trial. Prohibiting § 1404(a) transfers by transferee courts thus means only that the case
will usually be tried where it was originally filed. In the special circumstances where the
transferor judge believes he should not try the case, he may transfer under § 1404. The
transferor judge can make the § 1404(a) transfer determination as well or better than
the transferee judge because he can look to the interests of the particular parties and
weigh the advantages of a local, separate trial against a consolidated trial. See von Kali163
164
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It may be true, as the MDL Panel asserts, that the combined use
of section 1404(a) and section 1407 to order joint trial in the transferee forum results in making multidistrict litigation more efficient,
at least in some cases.' 68 But this overlooks the legislative history of
section 1407, which shows that Congress weighed this alternative
and rejected it and believed it would have to amend section 1407 to
confer this power on the MDL Panel or transferee courts.1 69 Nevertheless, in the fifteen years since section 1407 was enacted, transferee judges, to whom the statute only gives pretrial authority, have
repeatedly transferred cases to themselves for trial. The MDL
Panel, which is required by section 1407 to remand all consolidated
actions at the close of pretrial, has remanded few, and has stated
that it has neither the authority nor the desire to control the decisions of the transferee judge. 170 Because the transferee judge supervises the daily progress of the litigation, the MDL Panel usually
will not remand except at the suggestion of that judge. 17 1 When
confronted with section 1404(a) motions, transferee courts have denied transfers only where those transfers would have put the parties
in an improper venue or were requested prematurely. 172 In light of
the above, it seems clear that the lower federal courts have done by
judicial fiat what Congress refused to do by statute in 1969: amend
section 1407 to allow transfers for trial as well as pretrial purposes.
Because Congress has never given the MDL Panel or transferee
judges the authority to order joint trials in the transferee forum and
because in most mass tort cases the joint trial of common issues is
undesirable anyway,' 7 3 transferee courts should abandon the practice of ordering joint trials in mass tort cases.
nowski, supra note 144, at 199-200; .Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal
Courts, 40 FORDHAm L. REV. 41, 63 (1971); Comment, PretrialConsolidation in Complex Federal Multi-DistrictLitigation, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 433, 442-43 (1970).
168
See In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239, 242 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969); see also Note, supra
note 134, at 1036-40 (recommending that Congress revise § 1407 to allow the MDL
Panel to transfer multidistrict litigation to one court for trial as well as for pretrial
proceedings).
169
In fact, the ease with which Congress could make such an amendment was
pointed out when § 1407 was enacted. H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 151, at 4.
170
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 436 F. Supp. 990, 996
(J.P.M.D.L. 1977). See In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litig., 436 F. Supp. 402, 404
(J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Secur. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 1378,
1384 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974).
171
See In re "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 108, 110
(J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Holiday Magic Secur. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126
(J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
172
See Note, supra note 134, at 1031 n.160; see also Weigel, supra note 141, at 583 &
n.62 (less than five percent of § 1407 cases transferred are remanded back to the transferor forum).
173
See infra notes 229-53, 272-92 and accompanying text.
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PracticalLimitations on Consolidation through the Use of
Interdistrict Venue Transfers

So long as Congress and the Supreme Court continue to acquiesce, it remains theoretically possible, through the use of interdistrict venue transfers, to consolidate for purposes of discovery and
trial all claims arising from a mass tort which are filed in the federal
court system. In practice, however, complete consolidation is often
impossible. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 only empowers federal courts to consolidate pending actions; they may not consolidate
unfiled claims. 174 In addition, cases filed in state court cannot be
consolidated with those in federal court. This is a recurring problem in mass tort cases because the plaintiffs' claims typically arise
under state law and thus can be brought in federal court only on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. Without complete diversity plaintiffs
cannot proceed in federal court,' 75 and even if the federal court
would have jurisdiction, many plaintiffs choose to file in state court.
Furthermore, once a case is filed in state court, it cannot be re76
moved if any defendant is a citizen of the forum state.
Although complete consolidation for trial is impossible where
plaintiffs have filed claims in both state and federal courts, in some
mass tort cases the federal judge before whom all the federal cases
are consolidated may be able to coordinate pretrial discovery and
other matters with the state judge before whom the state cases are
consolidated.1 77 Coordinated pretrial discovery of this nature can
result in substantial savings and should therefore be used liberally
in mass tort cases.
D.

Adjudicating Related Claims Without Joinder

When a court denies formal joinder or consolidation of related
claims in a mass tort case, two options remain open to minimize the
inefficiencies and costs of trying such claims on an individual basis.
First, the parties, their counsel, or individual judges can informally
coordinate related litigation. In the alternative, offensive collateral
estoppel may be relied on to preclude defendants from relitigating
common issues of fact or law determined adversely to them in prior
judgments. Neither option has proven widely available in practice.
Informal coordination of related litigation has resulted in substantial efficiencies in only a small number of mass tort cases where
174
See Pan Am. World Airways v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523
F.2d 1073, 1077 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975).
175 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
176 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
177
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 25, §§ 1.22, 1.94.
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plaintiffs and defendants were willing to cooperate,17 8 and most
courts have correctly refused to apply the doctrine of collateral es1 79
toppel in mass tort cases.
1. Informal Coordination of Discovery
Counsel have sometimes attempted informal coordination of
pretrial discovery in mass tort cases proceeding individually in numerous state and federal courts. 180 Participating individual plaintiffs typically pay a modest fee to a coordinating committee, which
provides sample pleadings and discovery requests, newsletters, and
relevant publications. In some cases, by agreement with defense
counsel, "lead" counsel for the plaintiffs conduct discovery which is
then shared with all participating plaintiffs.1 8 1 Informaljoint discovery can thus reduce the cost of discovery to all parties and ease the
18 2
burden on experts and fact witnesses.
Although informal coordination of pretrial discovery in mass
tort cases is often desirable, it is rarely used in practice. One impediment to cooperation is the suspicion, many times held by the
widely-dispersed lawyers involved in such cases, that coordination
will cause them to lose control of their cases, lose fees, or suffer
professionally. 18 3 More importantly, the advantages ofjoint discovery are possible in this context only when the defendant agrees to
allow the discovery to be admissible in related cases before the
courts. Few defendants have been willing to make such agreements.' 8 4 Thus, despite the desirability of informal coordination in
mass tort cases, some form of court-ordered pretrial consolidation
will usually prove necessary to obtain the benefits ofjoint discovery.
2.

Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases

Several commentators have urged that the courts use offensive
collateral estoppel to bar defendants from relitigating issues they
See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
This technique has been used in a number of mass product defect cases, including litigation over intrauterine devices, birth control pills, automobile motor mount failure, and the drugs diethylstilbestrol, Aralen, and MER/29. See Rheingold, supra note 18,
at 18.
178
179
180

181

Id. at 19.

Id. Defendants in mass tort cases proceeding in many venues may hire "national
counsel" to coordinate the defense of individual cases and minimize costs. See Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass DisasterLitigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
116, 124 (1968).
183
See Rheingold, supra note 182, at 125.
184
See Rheingold, supra note 18, at 19. "Test case" litigation has also proven of little
help in mass tort litigation because it also requires the consent of all affected litigants.
For a discussion of the possible usefulness of this technique, however, see Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 758-62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
182
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have lost in a prior action. 18 5 The availability of offensive collateral
estoppel in mass tort cases is quite limited, however. Many states
continue to reject the offensive use of collateral estoppel,186 and
even when permitted, fairness often dictates that it not be invoked
18 7
against a defendant.
In many cases the plaintiff or his lawyer probably were aware of
the prior litigation arising out of the mass tort and could have easily
joined the prior action because of the liberal joinder rules now in
effect in state and federal courts. 8 8 When the plaintiff seeking the
estoppel could have easily joined the earlier action, allowing the estoppel is unfair to the defendant who is exposed to enormous liability if he loses on the common questions in the first action but who
cannot protect himself from liability by winning because the nonparty plaintiffs are not bound by thejudgment. 18 9 This unfairness is
185

See Overton, The Restatement ofJudgments, CollateralEstoppel, and Conflict of Laws, 44

L. REV. 927, 938, 942-44 (1977); Wolcott, Collateral Estoppel and Other Practical
Approaches to CommercialAir Crash Claims, 13 N.Y.L.F. 509, 513-17 (1967); Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 55, 85-90 (1978); Note,
CollateralEstoppel--The Multiple Tort ClaimantAnomaly, 41 Miss. LJ. 497, 500-02, 506-07
(1970). But see Gunn, The Offensive Use of CollateralEstoppelin Mass Tort Cases, 52 Miss. LJ.
765, 782-99 (1982) (offensive collateral estoppel generally, but not always, improper in
mass tort cases); Weinberger, CollateralEstoppel and the Mass ProducedProduct: A Proposal,
15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 35-55 (1979) (offensive collateral estoppel should be allowed in
mass product defect cases only where defect is "intrinsic" and provable by empirical
evidence).
186 To date over 20 states have expressly rejected or failed to embrace the use of
offensive collateral estoppel. See Russell v. Atlas Van Lines, 411 F. Supp. 111 (E.D.
Okla. 1976) (rejecting Oklahoma Court of Appeal's nonprecedential decision to the contrary); Suggs v. Alabama Power Co., 271 Ala. 168, 123 So. 2d 4 (1960); Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977); Hogan v. Bright, 214 Ark. 691,
218 S.W.2d 80 (1949); Daigneau v. National Cash Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Porterfield v. Gilmer, 132 Ga. App. 463, 208 S.E.2d 295 (1974),
af'd, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975); Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Speidel,
181 Ind. App. 448, 392 N.E.2d 1172 (1979); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockhan Ins. Agency,
209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265 (1972); Barnett v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.2d 834 (Ky.
1961); Knighten v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 121 So. 2d 344 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Home
Owners Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448,
238 N.E.2d 55 (1968); Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 191
N.W.2d 313 (1971); Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 254 Miss. 266, 179 So. 2d 188 (1965);
Atencio v. Vigil, 86 N.M. 181, 521 P.2d 646 (1974); King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348,
200 S.E.2d 799 (1973); Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282 (N.D. 1972); Goodson v.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983); Algood v.
Nashville Mach. Co., 648 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Trapeni v. Walker, 120 Vt.
510, 144 A.2d 831 (1958); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 272
S.E.2d 217 (1980); Stewart, ResJudicataand CollateralEstoppel in South Carolina, 28 S.C.L.
REV. 451, 475-78 (1977).
187
See Parkane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTs § 29 (1982); infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text (detailing grounds of unfairness).
188
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 20, 24.
189
See Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppek Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 281, 310-13 (1957); see also Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 778, 327
TENN.
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especially troubling in close cases where a reasonable jury could
easily have found for either party in the first action. In such circumstances there is no certainty that the initial verdict was correct and
imposing the facts found in the first action on all later cases is unfair. Each verdict should be rendered separately on its particular
facts. 9 0° In most of the mass disaster cases in which courts have
granted the estoppel, it has rested not on one, but on a series of
prior judgments against the defendant where evidence of the defendant's liability was very strong.' 9 '
In many mass product defect cases, courts have refused to allow
the use of offensive collateral estoppel because the issue on which
the plaintiffs in the second action sought the estoppel factually differed from that adjudicated in the first action. In a mass product
defect case, the plaintiff seeking estoppel must show an identity in
both cases of the product used, 19 2 the defect claimed, and the cir93
cumstances surrounding its purchase and use by the plaintiff.'
P.2d 111, 119 (1958) (offensive collateral estoppel inapplicable to multiple claims by
different plaintiffs arising out of auto accident-concern for justice outweighs interest in
efficiency); Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 164 Cal. App. 2d 400, 403, 330 P.2d 93,
935 (1958) (applying Nevarov holding to claims arising out of train accident). For this
reason courts have denied plaintiffs who opt out of a common question class action the
opportunity to plead an estoppel based on the judgment obtained by the class. See Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp., 483 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1973);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 42(1)(c) comment d (1982). But see In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (allowing plaintiffs to assert collateral estoppel against defendant in prior class action suit from which
plaintiffs had opted out); Note, Offensive Assertion of CollateralEstoppel by PersonsOpting Out
of a Class Action, 31 HASTINGs LJ. 1189, 1206-14 (1980) (suggesting that existing safeguards would prevent abuse of collateral estoppel by plaintiffs who opt out of class action suit).
190 See Flanagan, Offensive Collateral Estoppek Inefficiency and Foolish Consistency, 1982
ARIz. ST. LJ.45, 63, 71.
191 See Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (C.D. Cal.
1981) (airplane crash where first action involved consolidated trial of 12 wrongful death
claims-estoppel allowed in two subsequent cases involving plaintiffs who had unsuccessfully sought to be parties to prior action); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp.
298, 304-05 (D. Md. 1967) (airplane crash where first action involved consolidated trial
of wrongful death claims-estoppel allowed in three subsequent cases); United States v.
United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 728-29 (D. Nev. 1962) (airplane crash where first
action involved consolidated trial of 24 wrongful death claims-estoppel allowed as to
remaining seven claims), afd in part and modified in part sub nom. United Air Lines v.
Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). In each of these
cases there was also no prior inconsistent judgment, an absolute identity of issues existed, and the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior action. But
see Hart v. American Airlines, 61 Misc. 2d 41, 44-45, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (Sup. Ct.
1969) (estoppel allowed in airline crash case in two subsequent cases based on single
prior case which adjudicated issue of defendant's liability).
192 See Williams v. Laurence-David, Inc., 271 Or. 712, 721-23, 534 P.2d 173, 177-78
(1975) (collateral estoppel improper in product defect case where absolute identity of
product not proved).
193 See Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass Produced Product: A Proposal 15
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 25-55 (1979).
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This burden may prove impossible to satisfy unless the defect is intrinsic to the product and the defect's "existence can be determined
through the use of empirical and precise evidence."' 9 4 What the
plaintiff must show to prove that a product is "defective" also varies
widely under state law. 19 5 Thus, a product that has been found defective under the law of one state is not necessarily defective under
the law of another.' 96
In addition, tort claims based on the unreasonableness of the
manufacturer's warning of possible dangers from a product's use do
not lend themselves to application of offensive collateral estoppel.
Whether the product's warning was inadequate or not will, in most
cases, turn on the particular circumstances of the plaintiff's use of
the product and his personal knowledge of the dangers.' 9 7 For similar reasons, establishing the necessary identity of issues for estoppel can be difficult in mass product defect cases involving theexposure of workers to a toxic product. The identity of the toxic
product, the time and duration of the plaintiff's exposure, his knowledge and appreciation of warnings, working conditions, and illnesses all may differ substantially from one case to another. 19 As a
result, a finding in the first case that the product was defective may
not be sufficient for estoppel on the issue of defectiveness in the
second case.' 9 9 Similarly, in mass disaster cases the issue of whether
the defendant's actions proximately caused the plaintiff's injury
often depends upon facts unique to each plaintiff. The use of collateral estoppel on the issue of causation is therefore improper. 20 0 Because many mass tort cases contain significant factual differences on
194
Weinberger, supra note 193, at 36. But see Erlenbach, Offensive CollateralEstoppel
and Products Liability: Reasoningwith the Unreasonable, 14 ST. MARY's LJ. 19, 49-53 (1982)
(rejecting Weinberger's test as unworkable and "specious").
195 See Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 61, 75-76 (1982).
196
See Erlenbach, supra note 194, at 28.
197
Weinberger, supra note 193, at 38. For similar reasons, courts have denied collateral estoppel in drug defect cases. See Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211, 218-19,
377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 125-26 (1975) (finding no identity of issue with prior Quadrigen drug
case). But see Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1979) (granting
estoppel based on identity of issue with prior Quadrigen drug case).
198
At least one proposed federal products liability act has provided that neither
plaintiffs nor defendants may invoke collateral estoppel to bar litigation of an issue unless they show that the injury sustained occurred in the "same event" as that considered
in the prior action. See S.2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(d)(1)-(2) (1982). This bill is
discussed in Birnbaum & Wrubel, Federal Product Liability Legislation: An Overview, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 9, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
199 See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 344-46 (5th Cir. 1982);
Comment, An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALn. L. REV. 1307,
1340 (1982).
200 See Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 851-53 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982).
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such issues as proximate causation or affirmative defenses, 20 even
when estoppel is correctly applied to common issues between two
cases, it only serves to avoid retrial of these common issues; use of
the estoppel cannot obviate the need for substantial discovery and
individual trials on the noncommon issues.
Attempts to assert estoppel in mass tort cases have also foundered on the failure to establish the defendants' ability to foresee
future litigation at the time of the initial adverse judgment, 20 2 the
existence of inconsistent verdicts, 20 3 and the presence of jury compromise. 20 4 These problems are not unique to the mass tort cases,
but courts have been especially reluctant to allow offensive collateral estoppel in such cases because of their usual complexity and
the importance of insuring fairness. 20 5 Thus, while offensive collateral estoppel may contribute to the fair and efficient adjudication of
some cases, its limited utility in most mass tort cases makes it unsuitable as a primary technique for the management of mass tort
litigation.
E.

Preliminary Conclusions

Having surveyed the various restrictions which limit the availability ofjoinder and the use of offensive collateral estoppel in mass
tort cases, several preliminary conclusions are now possible. First,
the limited fund class action is a properjoinder device in only a very
small number of cases because most mass tort defendants have substantial assets and insurance coverage. In those few cases where a
limited fund class action is proper, however, the court should certify
a class action. Otherwise, there is a reasonable likelihood that plaintiffs' losing the "race to the courthouse" will be unable to obtain fair
compensation for their injuries. This prospect justifies the use of a
limited fund class action because the interest of each class member
in receiving a fair share of the limited fund outweighs his interest in
individual control of his claim. The standard proposed here for certifying limited fund mass tort class actions would restrict them to
cases where there is a reasonable danger that the plaintiffs' claims
See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 346-47; Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 538-41 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
983 (1966).
203
See Hardy v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 346 (by time appeal in Hardy
was decided, 70 asbestos cases had been tried, with verdicts for defendants in about half
of those cases); Erbeck v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 444,447 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (inconsistent verdicts in swine flue litigation made use of collateral estoppel unfair).
204
See Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
205
See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 348 ("To do otherwise
would be to elevate judicial expedience over considerations of justice and fair play.").
201

202
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will exceed the defendant's available assets. 20 6 In these special circumstances mandatory participation in the class action by all plaintiffs is proper and desirable.
Second, the partial consolidation of all related mass tort claims
in a common federal venue for pretrial purposes is possible in most
cases, although complete consolidation of all such claims is unlikely
because of the near certainty that some plaintiffs will file nonremovable claims in state courts. The widespread practice of ordering
joint trials of cases transferred pursuant to section 1407, however, is
improper and should cease.
Third, although a common question class action is a possible
joinder device in most mass tort cases, whether this device is superior to consolidation or nojoinder in a given case depends primarily
on the efficiencies promised by each alternative weighed against its
impact on individual control over claims and the fairness of the trial
process. Section III attempts to balance these concerns. First, however, it is necessary to determine why and to what extent individual
control of tort claims is thought important, how each alternative affects individual control, and what impact joint trial of separate issues has on the jury process.
II
UNWANTED SIDE EFFECTS OF JOINDER IN MASS TORT
CASES

A.

The Loss of Individual Control of Claims in Personal Injury
Litigation
1. A HistoricalPerspective: The Bill of Peace

The proposition that a competent person who has suffered substantial personal injuries may be compelled in some circumstances
to surrender control over his claim is a modern one. Much of the
past and present resistance to joinder in mass tort cases arises from
a concern for preserving individual control over the management,
timing, location, and tactics of a personal injury suit. The history of
the controversy surrounding the earliest form ofjoinder in mass tort
cases-the bill of peace-illustrates and explains the traditional op20 7
position to forced joinder of personal injury claims.
Common law pleading prohibited joinder of parties to assert
related claims arising out of a mass tort. Joinder of plaintiffs was
206

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

207

For an overview of bills of peace, "spurious" class actions, and other precursors

to modem joinder devices, see Comment, ProceduralDevicesfor Simplifying Litigation Stemming From A Mass Tort, 63 YALE L.J. 493 (1954).
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proper only if their claims involved a "technical joint interest. '20 8
Because of the limited nature ofjoinder at law, equity moved to prevent repetitious litigation with remedies such as the bill of peace.
The bill of peace permitted a party faced with the prospect of defending numerous related lawsuits to take the initiative and sue all
of the putative plaintiffs in one action, thereby joining all related
claims in one forum. 20 9 Although bills of peace were commonly said
to be available to prevent a multiplicity of suits at law, 21 0 this did not
mean that chancery was open to mass tort litigation. A careful survey of the seventeenth and eighteenth century English cases has
found no instance of group litigation consisting of a series of common law damage actions aggregated together. 21 1 In America opposition to development of the "common question" bill of peace as a
joinder device in tort cases reflected a similar reluctance to force
individual tort litigants with personal injury claims to join their
21 2
claims.
In the nineteenth century, the vast majority of American chancery courts allowed the forced joinder of claims by a bill of peace
only if a community of interest existed among the defendants in
equity (plaintiffs at law) in the subject matter of litigation. The defendants in equity had either to "asser[t] a common right or [have]
engaged jointly in the commission of a common wrong, violative of
a single right." 2 13 The strict community of interest test precluded
use of the bill of peace in mass tort cases because the defendants in
equity did not plead a common right. Each defendant in equity's
claim at law derived individually from their own personal injury.
Thus, the traditional view of the bill of peace was derived from the
notion in common law pleading that litigation is a personal and indi21 4
vidual enterprise.
Examples of a joint interest include: joint promisees on the same obligation or
208
instrument, partners in a firm at the time of the contract, B. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW
PLEADING § 226 (3d ed. 1923), or joint owners of property which was damaged. C.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 56 (2d ed. 1947). See also F.JAmES & G. HAZARD, CIVL PROCEDURE § 10.7, at 463 (2d ed. 1977) (absent technical joint interest in claim, joinder of
plaintiffs was improper at common law).
209 See Note, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties,45 HARV. L. REv. 1297, 1297-98 (1932)
(Note authored by Zechariah Chaffee, Jr.).
210 See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUIrv 200-01 (1950).
211
See Yeazell, Group Litigationand Social Context: Toward a Histoy of the ClassAction, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 866, 888 (1977).

212
See Comment, ProceduralDevicesfor Simplifying Litigation Stemming From a Mass Tort,
63 YALE L.J. 493, 503-04 (1954); see also infra notes 214, 221-25 and accompanying text.
213 S. STEELE, EQurrYJURISPRUDENCE 435 (1927).
214 In Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1931), the Fourth

Circuit stated:

[Tihe wholly fortuitous, accidental, and collateral fact that numerous
other persons have like, but entirely independent and disconnected, legal
rights, estates, or defenses cannot, on any conceivable principle, invest
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Commentators, such as Pomeroy and Chafee, attacked traditional limitations on use of the bill of peace. They championed this
equitable remedy as a useful joinder device for avoiding a multiplicity of suits at law. 2 15 Pomeroy noted that suits presenting common
questions of fact or law or suits with parties having a community of
interest in the subject matter could result in needless litigation if not
joined. 2 16 He therefore advocated the use of bills of peace where
common questions of fact or law were presented in separate suits
between a number of plaintiffs at law (defendants in equity) against
one defendant at law (plaintiff in equity). 2 17 Unlike the traditional
bill of peace, Pomeroy's "common question" bill of peace did not
require a common or joint interest in the subject matter of the
suit 2 18 and thus was theoretically available in mass tort cases. 2 19 By
the middle of this century a majority of American courts had accepted Pomeroy's position, 2 20 thereby making this joinder device
available in mass tort actions.
Although theoretically the "common question" bill of peace
has long been available in most jurisdictions, American courts have
not used it to compel the joinder of damage claims for personal injuries or wrongful death in mass tort cases. 22 1 Only claims for damage to property have been joined by a bill of peace in mass tort
cases. 2 22 Indeed, some courts considered the possibility of mass
him with any right, legal or equitable, and his rights, whatever they may
be, are precisely the same as if no other person had similar rights.
A related concern was that a bill of peace based solely on common questions of law or
fact would interfere with the defendants' right to jury trial. Id.
215 See 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 122, § 255, at 434; Note, supra note 209, at 1299
(Chafee also preferred bill of peace to alternative of repetitious and expensive suits at
law); Note, TheJurisdictionof Equity Relating to Multiplicity of Suits, 24 YALE LJ. 642 (1915)
(calling for adoption of Pomeroy's position).
216 See 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 122, § 256, at 435-40.
217 See id. § 255, at 431-34.
218 See id. at 432-34.
219
The joint interest requirement kept the traditional bill of peace from being available in mass tort cases. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. Thus, by eliminating this requirement, Pomeroy's proposal made the bill of peace available in mass
tort cases.
220 See Yuba Consol. Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, 206 F.2d 884, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1953)

(majority of American courts have adopted Pomeroy's view).
221
The courts have denied the bill each time it has been sought in mass tort cases
involving personal injury claims. See, e.g., Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson, 43 Ind. App.
226, 242, 255-56, 87 N.E. 47, 51, 57 (1909) (in case involving injury and death in mine
explosion, court denied bill after finding no common right among parties); Southern
Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 174 Ala. 465, 477-80, 57 So. 11, 14-15 (1911) (same); Gulf&
S.I.R. Co. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 512-16, 48 So. 823, 829-31 (1909) (denying bill on
grounds that different defenses stemming from different injuries resulting from train
wreck would make bill a single proceeding in name only).
222
See, e.g., Yuba Consol. Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, 206 F.2d at 884 (property damage
resulting from flood); Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. v. Charles, 258 F. 723
(M.D. Ala. 1919) (same).
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tort bills of peace a prime factor militating against adoption of the
"common question" bill. 2 23 This hostility of American courts to
forced joinder in mass tort litigation stemmed at least in part from
the notion that personal injury litigation was the private affair of
each litigant. 2 24 Even though the common question bill of peace
was an efficient way to avoid a vexatious multiplicity of lawsuits,
courts refused to use it for fear it would compromise the more im22 5
portant right of the individual to seek his own remedy.
Other considerations also led courts to reject the bill of peace
in mass tort cases. Some courts refused to allow mass tort bills if the
plaintiffs could consolidate claims at law because equity jurisdiction
cannot be invoked if adequate relief is available at law. 2 26 Other
courts restricted access to equity in order to preserve the parties'
right to a jury trial. 2 27 Complexity, potential for confusion, and individualized fact patterns and legal issues also led courts to deny
mass tort bills. 2 28 Nevertheless, the consistent refusal of courts to
allow bills of peace where personal injury claims were in issue illustrates the importance American courts have traditionally attached to
individual control over the prosecution of damage claims, especially
those for personal injuries or wrongful death.
223
E.g., Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 70 Miss. 182, 190-91, 12 So. 32, 33-34
(1892). The Tribette court explained its refusal to adopt the common question bill of
peace as follows:
If it is true . . . that mere community of interest [is sufficient,] . . . all
sorts of cases must be subject to the principle,. . . and strange results
might flow from its adoption. The wrecking of a railroad train might give
rise to a hundred actions for . . . the death of a passenger, and, ...
claims . . . for divers injuries. . . . [A]ll of these numerous plaintiffs,
having a community of interest in the questions of fact and law, ...
could be brought before a chancery court in one suit. . . . Surely the
learned author would shrink from the contemplation of such a spectacle.
Id.
224
See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679,
689, 79 S.E.2d 167, 173 (bill denied because each injured person should have separate
action), reh'g denied, 240 N.C. 196, 81 S.E.2d 404 (1953); Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson,
43 Ind. App. 226, 232, 87 N.E. 47, 49 (1909) (parties having separate cause of action
against same person cannot join as plaintiffs).
See, e.g., Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson, 101 Miss. 1, 14, 57 So. 559,
225
562 (1912) (each plaintiff in tort case has right "to have his suit determined upon its own
merits, free and untrammeled, and independent of the suits of the other plaintiffs").
226
See CarolinaPower &Light Co., 238 N.C. at 687, 79 S.E.2d at 173; Guy F. Atkinson
Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 236 Or. 405, 413, 389 P.2d 32, 35 (1964).
227
See Georgia Power Co., 49 F.2d at 69-70; Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, 173 Ala.
347, 349, 56 So. 198, 199 (1911); Vandalia Coal Co., 43 Ind. App. at 249, 87 N.E. at 55;
Guy F. Atkinson Corp., 236 Or. at 409-10, 389 P.2d at 34.
228
See Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 174 Ala. 465, 57 So. 11, 15 (1909) (use of
equity jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of suits would result in confusion because of
innumerable issues of law and fact); Roanoke Guano Co., 173 Ala. at 360, 56 So. at 202-03
(in determining whether equity jurisdiction exists to avoid multiplicity of suits, courts
should ask whether consolidation will confuse issues to be tried).
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Modern Joinder Devices and the Individual's Interest in Control

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize an individual
litigant's interest in controlling the prosecution of his own tort claim
as an important consideration limiting the desirability of the common question class action. 2 29 The individual's interest in personal
control directly relates to the nature and size of his tort claim. Recently courts have certified class actions where the plaintiffs have
suffered only property damage 230 or relatively minor personal injuries. 23 1 They have been extremely reluctant, however, to do so in
serious personal injury or wrongful death cases because the nature
of the claim indicates a strong interest in personal control over its
management. 23 2 As the severity of the plaintiffs injury increases,
the psychological and emotional importance of individually vindicating his rights against the responsible parties also increases. The importance of a family's control over its claim for the wrongful death
of its sole provider, for example, cannot be gainsaid.
In a mass tort case several factors affect the plaintiffs interest in
individual control over his personal injury or wrongful death claim.
First, the individual plaintiff may perceive a number of tactical advantages in proceeding alone. Because significant differences in
likely jury awards for particular injuries are perceived to exist between judicial districts, 2 33 an individual plaintiff will probably file his
case in the most convenient, high-award district that the applicable
venue and jurisdictional rules permit. Defendants have a very heavy
229 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(,A).
230 See, e.g., In re Asbestos School Litig., 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 8, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(class action on behalf of school districts for property damage due to asbestos allowed
because "many of the jurisprudential considerations. . . which have led courts to hesitate to certify mass tort cases [involving personal injury claims] are not present in this
case.") (citations omitted); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.,
47 F.R.D. 155, 158 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (class action allowed where damages were for property loss due to fire).
231 See, e.g., Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401, 404
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (passengers on cruise ship allowed to bring class action where food
poisoning caused only minor injuries); accord Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61
F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), afd mem., 507 F.2d 1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1975) (same).
232 See, e.g., Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (class
action inappropriate for wrongful death actions arising out of bus accident), affd on other
grounds, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946 (1974); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (class action inappropriate where airplane
crash resulted in death); see also Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399
(E.D. Va. 1975) (class action inappropriate for wrongful death actions arising out of
airplane crash); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (class action
inappropriate for resolving injury and wrongful death claims arising from exposure to
asbestos); Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 3d 150, 155, 166 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19
(1980) (discussing general reluctance to allow class actions in mass tort cases involving
personal injuries).
233
See Rheingold, supra note 182, at 132 (primary determinant is judicial district's

level of urbanization).
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burden to overcome when trying to disturb the plaintiff's choice of
forum in individual cases. 23 4 In a mass tort case, however, if a class
action is requested, or the transfer of the related claims to a single
forum proposed, the deciding court is much less likely to defer to
the forum preferences of individual litigants. The court will more
likely site the litigation in the forum most convenient to witnesses or
where most or all of the injuries occurred. 23 5 The individual plaintiff may thus find himself before an unfamiliar jury in a district
where jury awards tend to be less generous than those generally
granted in the original forum. A plaintiff's right to have his damages evaluated by a jury familiar with his actual costs and economic
situation is a substantial interest worthy of protection in most mass
23 6
tort cases.
Second, if a class action is certified, the individual plaintiff may
find that the state law applied by the forum court is not as favorable
as the law which would have been applied had he been able to
choose his own forum. 2 37 The individual plaintiff also runs the risk
that the representative plaintiffs in a class action will elect to proceed on liability theories better suited for class treatment at the expense of theories especially favorable to the individual plaintiff.23 8
These important considerations may not be highlighted during the
certification process because named representatives and attorneys
for the putative class have strong personal or financial interests in
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Air Crash Near Denver, Colo. on Oct 3, 1969, 339 F. Supp. 415,
416 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972) (transfer ordered to situs of witnesses and documents); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp. 1394, 1395 (J.P.M.D.L.
1973) (per curiam) (transfer ordered to district where injures occurred and where majority of witnesses and documents were located). See also Levy, supra note 167, at 51
(MDL Panel has generally rejected parties' claims of inconvenience as "parochial" and
"self-interested"); Comment, supra note 167, at 438 (courts do not give convenience of
parties same weight in § 1407 cases as in forum non conveniens cases).
236
See Comment, supra note 167, at 452 (giving example of rural jury deciding city
dweller's claim).
237
For example, if a plaintiff dies from the use of a defective product and lives in a
state which has a strict products liability doctrine, but the mass product defect class
action is brought in a jurisdiction which does not recognize the strict products liability
doctrine at all or only with reservations, then the plaintiff's estate has a substantial interest in retaining individual control over prosecution of the claim. See Comment, Federal
Mass Tort, supra note 18, at 1215-27.
238
In consumer or securities cases, for example, representative plaintiffs in class
actions often rely on causes of action under federal statutes which are amenable to proof
on a class basis and often do not plead causes of action, such as common law fraud,
which are generally not suitable for class proof and which would therefore call into question whether a class action should be certified at all. See Comment, The Impact of Class
Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 338 (1971); see also, e.g., Hall v. Coburn
Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970) (class plaintiffs
dropped all but one theory of liability in order to avoid problems various liability theories would cause class as a whole).
234
235
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securing certification and will down-play possible conflicts of inter2 39
est within the class.
Third, class members lack the direct control that an individual
tort litigant can exercise over his own personal lawyer. The class
action plaintiff cannot easily influence or control the handling of his
claim. Even named plaintiffs exercise little control over class counsel. 240 Class counsel proceeds based upon his estimation of what
the interests of the class as a whole are, rather than those of individual plaintiffs, because no internal procedures exist by which a class
can make decisions. 2 4 ' Class counsel can thus easily ignore or
poorly serve the interests of individual class members. 24 2 Moreover,
some courts exacerbate this problem by placing restrictions on the
freedom of class counsel to communicate with absent class members
24 3
without court approval.
In summary, given the traditional respect afforded an individual
tort litigant's right to control the prosecution of a substantial personal injury or wrongful death claim, and that the plaintiff loses
much of this individual control when the court certifies a class action, courts should avoid using this joinder device to try these
244
cases.
See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 41, at 1440.
See Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973); Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1203-04 (1982); Developments in the
Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1450 (1981).
241
See Developments in the Law--Class Actions, supra note 41, at 1592-1604 (discussing
the attorney-client relationship in class actions).
242
See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note 240,
at 1453 (noting that neither the named plaintiffs, absent class members, nor "the public
interest" can be said to exercise control over class counsel). Compare In re Bendectin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 1984) (class action certification improper
in part because of conflicts of interest between attorneys representing interests of two
sub-classes).
243
See Comment, Restrictions on Communicationby Class Action PartiesandAttorneys, 1980
DuKE L.J. 360; see, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979); Siegal v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
244
It is no answer to this to assert that because individual plaintiffs may opt out of a
common question class action their interest in individual control is fully protected. But
see Comment, FederalMass Tort, supra note 18, at 1227. This view ignores several important points. First, the certification and later decertification of a class action disrupt the
normal progress of the litigation, result in the expenditure of substantial sums to provide notice to the class, can cause delay in the settlement of claims, and so can result in
substantial costs and inefficiencies. A substantial number of opt-outs is often likely in
mass tort cases. In the Federal Skywalk Cases, for example, 374 plaintiffs opted out of the
federal common question class action leaving only 24 persons in the class. See Morris &
See, The Hyatt Skywalks Litigation: The Plaintiffs' Perspective, 52 UMKC L. REV. 246, 270
(1984). Since the number of opt-outs may later cause decertification of the class, the
court should weigh the likelihood of opt-outs in deciding whether to certify a tort common question class action in the first place.
Second, a court should not certify a common question class action when other alternatives exist for better managing the litigation. See infra notes 300-05 and accompanying
239
240
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The consolidation for pretrial purposes of related mass tort
claims in a common venue by the MDL Panel can also adversely affect the ability of an individual litigant to retain control over the
development of his claim. The MDL Panel may consolidate related
tort actions before a single judge over the objection of individual
plaintiffs, 2 45 and an individual plaintiff has no right to opt out of the
consolidated proceedings. 24 6 Although theoretically the individual
plaintiff continues to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice,
in reality the court often selects a small committee of lawyers to represent the plaintiffs for purposes of most pretrial motions and discovery on issues relating to liability. The court may select the
lawyers committee over the objection of individual plaintiffs who
wish to have their own lawyers conduct the discovery.2 4 7 Individual
plaintiffs can thus lose control over the development of a case's
common issue because the legal committee will operate under internal constraints making it inevitable that the interests of individual
plaintiffs will be ignored or submerged in decisions concerning tac2 48
tics and discovery affecting the entire plaintiff group.
Whatever control the individual plaintiff loses by consolidation
for discovery purposes, he has even more to lose if the claims are
also consolidated for trial. If the MDL Panel consolidates the claims
for discovery only, 2 4 9 the individual plaintiff will at least retain control over the selection of forum, the legal theories pursued at trial,
and the lawyer who actually represents him. He will also be allowed
to conduct his own discovery on noncommon issues to supplement
the results of the discovery on common issues in the transferee forum.2 50 In this way, the individual plaintiff gains the benefits of cotext. Moreover, the supposed gains in efficiency made possible by the class action may
be largely illusory in many mass tort cases if a significant number of the liability, as well
as the damage, issues must be tried on an individual instead of a common basis. See
supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
245
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
246 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrTGATION, supra note 25, § 5.02.
247
See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d
1006, 1014-17 (5th Cir. 1977) (advocating use of lead counsel in complex litigation);
Rando v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 25 F.R.D. 483, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding that it
would be burdensome, oppressive, and unreasonable to let plaintiffs conduct their own
discovery). The Manualfor Complex Litigation explicitly recommends in such cases that
federal judges designate lead counsel to coordinate discovery if the parties fail to do so
themselves. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITGATION, supra note 25, § 1.92. See also Goodbody, Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 3 CLAss ACTION REP. 71, 73-74 (1974) (discussing usual manner of selecting lead counsel).
248 See McElhaney, A Pleafor the Preservation of the "Worm's Eye View" in Multidistrict
Aviation Litigation, 37J. AIR L. & COM. 49, 58 (1971).
249
Congress in fact intended that the MDL Panel consolidate such cases only for
discovery purposes and not for trial. See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
250
See In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 969, 974 (J.P.M.D.L.
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ordinated discovery without losing his traditional right to control
the prosecution of his own personal injury claim at trial.
When consolidation goes beyond discovery to trial, however,
the individual plaintiff's position approximates that of the absent
class member in a class action. 2 51 At trial, he lacks effective control
over the venue, the lawyers representing him, 25 2 the legal theories
relied upon, and the strategy and tactics employed. Further, he cannot opt out of the consolidated trial without court approval. 25 3 For
the same reasons that courts reject common question class actions
in mass tort cases, they should also reject the unauthorized practice
of allowing transferee judges to order the joint trial of mass tort
claims. The concern for the individual claimant's loss of control
makes both practices undesirable.
B.

Severed Issues, Special Verdicts and the Joint Trial of
Common Issues in Mass Tort Cases

Joinder affects individual control most adversely at the trial
stage. By necessity, only a small committee of plaintiffs' lawyers can
represent the large group of individual plaintiffs with claims before
the court. 254 Joint trial of mass tort claims may be impermissible if
joint trial of the claims would affect the substantive rights of the parties. Even if permissible, joint trial is undesirable where, as in most
mass tort cases, the severing of common and noncommon issues or
the use of special verdict forms skews the fairness of the
2 55
adjudication.
1979) (judge may provide for separate discovery tracks for parties uniquely situated, and
no party need participate in any pretrial proceeding unrelated to its interests).
251 See supra notes 233-43 and accompanying text.
252 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 25, § 4.53 (selection of lead
trial counsel); see also Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 774 (9th Cir.
1977) (approving use of lead counsel in mass disaster case).
253
See McElhaney, supra note 248, at 61 ("The depersonalizing of litigation. . . is
carried to a painful end when a wrongful death claim is removed from the home district,
and either effectively disposed or its settlement value altered, by events over which the
claimant has no control, and by lawyers other than his choosing in another forum."); see
also Seeley, Proceduresfor CoordinatedMulti-District Litigation: A Nineteenth Century Mind
Views with Alarm, 14 ANrrRusT BuLL. 91, 94 (1969) (disapproving of widespread
consolidation).
254
See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
255
See infra notes 272-92 and accompanying text. In addition, the joint trial of mass
tort claims in a given forum is proper only if the court has personal jurisdiction over all
of the plaintiffs as well as all of the defendants. It remains unclear whether a plaintiff
who lacks "minimum contacts" with the trial forum is bound by its judgment when a
joint trial is held after a class action is certified or when the plaintiffis case was transferred over the plaintiff's objection to the trial forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See Note,
Mechanical and ConstitutionalProblems in the Certification of Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort
Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517, 535-47 (1983); Note, Multistate
PlaintifClass Actions: Jurisdictionand Certification, 92 HARV. L. REv. 718 (1979); Note, State
CourtJurisdiction Over Multistate PlaintiffClass Actions: Minimum Contacts and Miner v. Gil-

1985]

MASS TORTJOINDER

825

1. Noncommon Issues Cannot be TriedJointly
In a class action or a consolidated action, the plaintiffs' various
claims may be tried jointly only if the common factual issues are
identical as to all plaintiffs. While attempting to achieve efficiency in
mass tort cases, courts should not abridge the substantive rights of
defendants by trying an issue, such as proximate causation, on a
joint basis when pertinent factual differences exist among plaintiffs
relating to that issue. Otherwise, the defendant's ability to offer evidence and to cross-examine witnesses relating to an individual
plaintiff's particular situation may be impaired or foreclosed
altogether.
In federal courts, the use of joinder rules in a manner which
affects the defendant's substantive rights violates the Rules Enabling
Act. 25 6 The Supreme Court has construed the Act to mean that federal rules of procedure must "really regulate procedure" and not
alter the substantive rights of the parties. 25 7 Although rule 23 may
be generally viewed as a joinder rule which "really regulates procedure" and does not affect the substantive rights of the litigants, 2 58
using this type of joinder to try noncommon questions on a joint
basis would impermissibly affect the substantive rights of the defendant. Ultimately the essential elements of the tort claims of each
plaintiff must be proven, and the plaintiff typically bears the burden
of proof. Therefore, a court should not presume or infer commonality of an issue throughout the class and allow proof of a noncommon issue on a joint basis. 25 9 The Rules Enabling Act prohibits
federal courts from employing a class-wide standard of proof which
differs from the standard of proof required of individual plaintiffs in
individual cases because it would affect the substantive rights of the
26 0
parties.
lette, 69 IowA L. REv. 795 (1984). See also Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan.
195, 679 P.2d 1159, cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 242 (1984) (question presented: does due
process prohibit a state court from exercising jurisdiction in a class action over nonresident class members).
256 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
257
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 713 (1941); accord,
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965). See generally Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie,
87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 718-20 (1974).
258
See Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 7 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 1758, at 570-72.
259 See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 280 n.20 (4th
Cir. 1980) (class action treatment of promotion-related title VII claims inappropriate
because representative plaintiff's claim would not be typical of all class members' claims,
where class members were employed at numerous, autonomous company facilities).
260
See Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d at 962-63 (separate statement of Edwards, J.); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975) (no substantive rights
were altered because standard of proof of causation used in class action applied to individual as well as class actions alleging fraud on market), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).

826

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:779

Even if all of the substantive elements of the plaintiffs' claims
present only common issues of fact, the Rules Enabling Act may bar
joint trial of the defendant's liability if it deprives the defendant of a
fair opportunity to assert and prove affirmative defenses he may
have against some, albeit not all, of the plaintiffs. 26 1 Moreover, allowing the substantive rights of tort litigants to vary according to
the fortuity of whether the alleged wrongful act injured one person
or many persons would compromise notions of fairness inherent in
due process. 262 As a result, neither state nor federal courts should
permit the promise of greater efficiencies through the use of joint
trials in mass tort cases to override the substantive rights of the
parties.
2.

Severing Issues to PermitJoint Trials

The joint trial of mass tort claims invariably requires the severance of some issues for individual trial at a later time before the
same or a different trier of fact. Where all of the liability issues are
common to the plaintiff group, there can be a joint trial of liability
followed by separate adjudication of individual damages. Courts
often follow this procedure in securities and antitrust class actions. 2 63 In mass tort cases, however, one or more of the elements
needed to establish liability or affirmative defenses frequently will
present noncommon questions. 2 64 Joint trial of the entire liability
question is then not practical. Jury confusion will inevitably result if
the court allows scores of individual plaintiffs to introduce evidence
concerning their particular experience. 26 5 As a result, joint trial is
Compare Comment, supra note 238, at 342-47 (complaining that objective standard of
proof for reliance-in-fact in securities fraud cases was allowed in class actions while subjective standard was used in individual cases).
261
Thus, for example, a class action cannot be used to circumvent the statute of
limitations so as to "revive claims which are no longer viable at the time of the [class]
filing." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978); accord, Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Hecht v. Cooperative For Amer. Relief
Everywhere, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
262
See U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV. See also Willner v. Committee on Character, 373
U.S. 96, 105 (1963) (due process "requirements of fairness are not exhausted in the
taking or consideration of evidence but extend to [all] parts of... procedure"); Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 (1930) (fairness of procedure is "due process
in the primary sense"); Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n (AAA), 501 F.2d 25, 28 (8th
Cir. 1974) (fundamental requirement of fairness is implicit in due process).
263
See, e.g., Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791, 798 (10th Cir.
1970) (bifurcation of common liability and individual damage issues approved in a price
discrimination case); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968) (bifurcation
of liability and damage issues approved in securities case), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
264
See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
265
See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 88 F.R.D. 174, 177-78 (D.D.C. 1980) (consol-
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possible only as to those liability issues which are common; the
court must try the remaining liability and damage issues later on an
individual basis.
Limited joint trials on particular issues are possible both in federal court and in most state courts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b) grants trial courts the power to order the separate trial of issues as well as claims. 26 6 Trial courts have broad discretion to order
the separate trial of claims or issues. 26 7 They may do so when it
would promote "expedition and economy" 268 or avoid jury confusion in a complicated case. 2 69 The presence of either or both of
these factors may warrant the separate trial of common and noncommon issues in mass tort cases. 2 70 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) allows juries to decide separate issues of fact without
determining the defendant's liability. 27 ' Nevertheless, even though
the joint trial of some issues may be permissible, its desirability is
questionable.
The authors of rule 42(b) intended the bifurcation of issues for
separate trial before different juries to be ordered sparingly. 2 72 In
personal injury litigation, the courts have usually heeded the drafters' intent. Most courts have rejected the routine bifurcation of liability and compensation issues because of its potential impact on the
traditional decisionmaking process ofjuries.2 73 One study reported
idated trial of multiple claims rejected as unfair because of risk ofjury confusion); see also
Galante, Megatrials,Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (questioning whether joint trial
of numerous related claims between a large number of parties is a fair and workable
procedure).
266
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) states:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or thirdparty claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
267
See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 216 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S.Ct. 2090 (1983); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 88 F.R.D. 174, 177 (D.D.C.
1980).
268
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D.
310, 322 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (severance of claims "conducive to expedition and
economy").
269
See Pearl Brewing Co. v.Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1133
(S.D. Tex. 1976); In re ParisAir Crash, 69 F.R.D. at 321.
270
See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d at 216 (separate trial on cause of fire
held proper under rule 42(b) to facilitate efficient trial).
271
See infra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
272
See FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b) advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 113 (1966); see also 9
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 2388, at 279 n.1 (citing cases).
273
See, e.g., Us v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 & n.7 (3d Cir.) (noting
that separating liability and damages issues may have substantive impact on outcome of
trials because of curtailed jury flexibility), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). Some states
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that although defendants win in forty-two percent of the ordinary
tort cases tried in a traditional manner, they win in seventy-nine percent of the cases in which the liability issue is bifurcated from the
damage issues and submitted alone. 274 This data suggests that jury
decisions on liability issues are colored by sympathy for the plaintiff
when presented with evidence concerning damages. 2 75 Whatever
the reason, any procedure which so drastically reduces the number
of cases in which plaintiffs prevail affects the fairness of the adjudicative process. Some commentators have urged that bifurcation is
desirable because it reduces prejudice against the defendant and undue sympathy for the plaintiff.2 76 Others have asserted the opposite, contending that bifurcation is undesirable because it impairs
the traditional role of the jury as a popular institution which temporizes the application of overly-rigid legal doctrine. 2 7 7 Whether perceived as desirable or not, the use of this procedure to make
possible joint trials in mass tort cases raises the risk of unfairness to
2 78
individual plaintiffs.
have prohibited outright the severance of liability and compensatory damage issues in
personal injury litigation. See Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 363-67, 311 S.W.2d 648,
649-51 (1958).
274
See Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies in THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29, 48 (H. Jones ed. 1965); see also Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation ofJuty Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule
Making Power, 14 VA.ND. L. REV. 831, 834 (1961) (summarizing empirical studies supporting view that juries often fuse liability and damages issues in order to discount damage
awards).
275
See Kalven, TheJury, The Law, and the PersonalDamageAward, 19 OHIo ST. LJ. 158,
167 (1958).
276 See, e.g., Vogel, The Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort Cases Should Be Separated
for the Purposes of Trial, 1960 A.B.A. SEC. OF INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. PROC. 265,
269.
277
See Weinstein, supra note 274, at 832-33; Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or Issue in
Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743, 761
(1955) (fusion of liability and damages issues by jury "lends a beneficial flexibility to the
strict rules of liability and contributory negligence").
278
In the litigation arising out of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, the trial court,
over the plaintiffs' objections, severed the issue of causation from the remainder of the
case against the defendant aluminum wire manufacturers. After a joint trial limited to
the causation issue, the jury returned a special verdict finding that aluminum wire had
not caused the fire. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that "[t]here is a danger that
bifurcation may deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate right to place before the jury the
circumstances and atmosphere of the entire cause of action. . . replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which causation is parted from the reality of injury." In
re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d at 217. Because of the disaster's notoriety and the
nature of the proof offered at the trial, however, the Sixth Circuit found the likelihood of
such prejudice insufficient to warrant reversal. Id. Because a retrial was necessary on
other grounds, however, the Sixth Circuit stated that the trial judge would have discretion to proceed in a different manner on remand. See also Kaufman & Lanter, Bendectin
Verdict Doesn't End Suits, Nat'l LJ., Mar. 25, 1985, at 3, col. 2 (plaintiff's lawyers complain
that severing issue of general causation from other liability and damage issues in mass
product defect case denied them a fair opportunity to adjudicate their claims).
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Despite the substantial impact bifurcation may have, the
Supreme Court has not held that the practice violates the right to
jury trial. The lower federal courts generally agree that the separate
submission of issues to the same jury does not violate the seventh
amendment. 27 9 The Supreme Court held in Gasoline Products Co. v.
Champlin Refining Co. 280 that the trial court may submit different issues arising from one claim to different juries, as the result of a remand on appeal, where the issues are so "distinct and separable"
28 1 Most
that separate trials of each may be had without injustice.
courts have interpreted Gasoline Products as allowing the separate
trial of "distinct and separable" issues before different juries in the
first instance and not simply in a retrial of erroneously decided issues. 28 2 They have held that separate trials of distinct issues before
different juries violate the seventh amendment only when the issues
separately to be tried are so "interwoven" that they cannot be submitted independently without such confusion and uncertainty as
2 83
would amount to the denial of a fair trial.
In mass tort cases, the issue of liability will normally involve
different proof and be subject to different legal rules from the issue
of compensatory damages. It is therefore improbable that the issues
will be so interwoven that the seventh amendment will require their
unified trial. But when factual differences between mass tort plaintiffs require that some liability issues be tried jointly and others separately, the litigant's right to trial by jury may be affected. For
279
See, e.g., Hosie v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 282 F.2d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1960)
(seventh amendment not violated by application of FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) because "essential character of a trial by jury was preserved") (dicta), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961);
Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 33 F.R.D. 335, 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (dicta) ("the
seventh amendment is not violated by the separate submission of issues to a single
jury"), aff'd, 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965).
280
283 U.S. 494 (1931).
281
Id. at 500. Accord, Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686,
693-94 (9th Cir.) ("there is no Seventh Amendment requirement that all evidence be
presented to the trier of fact at one hearing"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); In re Gap
Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 305 n.22 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (seventh amendment is not
offended where form of trial permits same jury consideration provided at common law);
Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 71 F.R.D. 606, 613-15 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (right to jury
trial not violated where liability and damages issues were separate and distinct), afd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 573 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Master Key
Antitrust Litig., 70 F.R.D. 23, 29 (D. Conn.) (same), appealdismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1975).
282
See, e.g., Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 659 (D. Colo. 1980) (use of
two juries in first instance analogous to practice in Gasoline Prods. and thus does not
violate seventh amendment); see also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 2391, at
301 (same).
283
See Franchi Constr. Co. v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 580 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir.
1978); United Air Lines v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.) (refusing to permit
separation of liability and damages issues where issues were so interwoven that separation would result in confusion), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961).
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example, submitting the issue of a manufacturer's negligence in labelling a product to one jury and the affirmative defense of an individual consumer's assumption of the risk to another jury might run
afoul of the rule that interwoven issues not be submitted to different
juries. Other liability issues, such as scope of employment 28 4 or
questions of causation, 28 5 may be sufficiently distinct from the remaining liability issues that severance is constitutionally permissible.
Even where constitutionally allowed, severance of common liability
issues from noncommon issues may prove undesirable when it
might alter the jury's disposition of the issues 2 86 or require that dif28 7
ferent juries decide the severed issues.
3.

The Use of Special Verdicts in Mass Tort Cases

The court must use a special verdict form if the jury trying the
common questions will not hear all of the factual issues necessary to
establish the defendant's liability. 2 88 The court cannot use a general
verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories under such circumstances because the jury will not be passing on all the factual issues
essential to rendering such a verdict. Special verdict forms constitute an undesirable technique for managing mass tort cases. The
majority of federal judges have long preferred general to special
verdict forms. 2 89 This distaste for the special verdict form arises primarily from the fear that it inhibits the proper power and freedom
of juries to temper strict rules of law by flexibly applying popular
notions ofjustice. 290 Thesejudges also fear that the court will err in
284 See, e.g., Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.) (in automobile negligence action against employer, defendant's scope of employment issue severable), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 866 (1963); Bernardo v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 200 F. Supp.
534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (in worker's compensation suit, plaintiff's scope of employment issue severable), afl'd, 314 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963).
285 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(issues of "general" and "specific" causation of injuries by herbicide held not so interwoven as to bar separate trials of separate issues), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond
Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984).
286
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
287 See Hunter, Split Trials in Negligence Cases Under Federal Rule 42(b), 3 FORUM 271,
274 (1968) (split trials before separate juries generally undesirable). Compare Comment,
supra note 127, at 380 (consolidated trial ofjury and nonjury cases undesirable).
288 FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
289 Federal judges make little use of special verdicts. See Guinn, The Jury System and
Special Verdicts, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 175, 178 (1970); see also Brown, Federal Special Verdicts:
The Doubt Eliminator,44 F.R.D. 338, 352-53 (1967) (special verdict rarely used); Driver, A
Considerationof the More Extended Use of the Special Verdict, 25 WASH. L. REV. 43, 45 (1950)
(same).
290 See Comment, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 76 YALE
L.J. 483, 495-97 (1965); see also Traynor, Fact Skepticism and theJudicialProcess, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 635, 638 (1958) (arguing that juries impose liability without fault in negligence
cases by adopting instructions on fluid concepts such as proximate cause); Wyzanski, A
TrialJudge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1952) (trial judges
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drafting the questions and that an unnecessarily confused jury will
return inconsistent answers. 2 9 1 This reluctance seems particularly
evident in tort cases. 2 9 2 Because in many mass torts special verdicts
are the only way in which the joint trial of common issues is possible, the disadvantages encountered when special verdict forms are
used provide another reason for courts to shun the joint trial of
mass tort claims in favor of individual trials.
III
BALANCING THE IMPERATIVE OF FAIRNESS WITH THE
DESIRE FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY THROUGH
JOINDER

The loss of individual control over the prosecution of personal
injury claims occasioned by split trials and their unpredictable impact on the fair adjudication of mass tort cases weigh heavily against
joint trials in such cases. But the massive inefficiency which results
when there is no coordinated management of the related claims
arising from a mass tort militates strongly against complete
nonjoinder.
Absent some form ofjoinder, each of the numerous claims will
proceed separately, often in a large number of venues. Thus, the
individual litigation of mass tort claims will typically result in a heavy
demand on available judicial resources, the costly replication of
pleading, discovery, and proof relating to common issues of fact or
law, troubling inconsistencies in the conclusions reached by different triers of fact on common factual issues, and the application of
different legal rules by different courts to common questions of
law. 2 93 Offensive collateral estoppel will be allowed only sparingly
in mass tort cases. 29 4 Thus it will do little to offset the inefficiencies
created by nonjoinder. 295 The total litigation costs of most mass
indirectly permit juries to be "the device by which the rigor of the law is modified").
Justices Black and Douglas believed that special verdicts weaken the constitutional
power of juries and should not be allowed. 374 U.S. 865, 867-68 (1963) (dissenting
from adoption of 1963 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
291 See Comment, supra note 290, at 509-15.
292 Nordbye, Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L.

REV. 672, 685 (1952) ("in many cases, it seems that little is to be gained from the use of
the special verdict procedure").
293 Inconsistent adjudications of identical issues threaten the public's perception of
the judicial system as a dispenser of equal justice. See Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d
720, 723-24 (10th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (court remanded case for consideration of rule
60 motion for relief from judgment, in view of potentially inconsistent adjudications),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976). But compare Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 396-99 (1981) (public policy does not justify reversing judgments against some

plaintiffs merely because of success of similarly situated plaintiffs).
294
295

See supra § I.D.

See supra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
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tort cases is enormous. 296 It is unknown whether mass tort litigation is comparatively more efficient than simple tort litigation on a
per claim basis. 29 7 Nevertheless, the high cost of litigating a single
tort claim seems particularly objectionable when it is multiplied by
the many claims arising from a single mass tort.
Obstacles to the rapid settlement of mass tort cases further inflate the cost of such litigation. In a mass tort case, the absence of
any structure for achieving a global settlement of all claims against a
particular defendant may inhibit the compromise of individual
claims for damages. Settlement efforts may also be slowed by the
unwillingness of defendants to compromise some individual claims
for fear of an adverse effect on settlement demands in other
98
cases. 2
Litigation costs to individual plaintiffs will not ameliorate the
inefficiencies created by denying joinder because plaintiffs will
rarely be deterred by such costs. The serious nature of the plaintiffs injuries and the widespread availability of contingent fee representation make private litigation on an individual basis financially
feasible.299

Mass tort cases thus confront courts with a procedural conundrum: how to preserve fairness while promoting efficiency. Courts
must weigh the importance of allowing plaintiffs to retain individual
control over their claims and the disadvantages of split trials against
the desire for greater efficiency through joinder. The wide variety
of fact patterns and issues in mass tort cases make it unlikely that
296
See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. Even in simple tort cases, costs are
high and fees paid to lawyers may exceed the amount paid in compensation to the plaintiff. One study of ordinary tort litigation in New York concluded that attorneys fees
generally consumed 36% of the money recovered by the plaintiff. Franklin, Chanin &
Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1961). See also E. BERNZWEIG, By ACCIDENT, NOT DESIGN: THE

CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE INJURy REPARATION 85-89 (1980); Blum & Kalven, Public Law

Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641
(1964); Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 1115 (1959); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary
Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983).
297 No definitive study has yet been undertaken to determine the general efficiency
of the American tort compensation system.
298 See infra notes 309-19 and accompanying text.
299 See Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics
of PersonalInjury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 22 n.103 (1961); see also Fullam, supra note
18, at 377; Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L.
REV. 433, 469 (1960). In some types of mass torts where each plaintiff's injury is comparatively small and the obstacles to establishing the defendant's liability unusually difficult or expensive, the denial ofjoinder may deter many putative plaintiffs from suing.
One commentator has recently asserted that the difficulty and expense of proving causein-fact in many mass product defect cases are such that the only financially feasible way
to proceed is on a group basis. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 908-16.
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any single procedure will prove best in all mass tort cases. Nevertheless, this Article contends that in most mass tort cases courts
should follow the procedures suggested below to strike a proper
balance between the dangers ofjoinder and its advantages.
A.

Coordinated Pretrial Discovery

Joint or coordinated discovery by plaintiffs and defendants on
common factual issues is desirable. The substantial costs of discovery can be reduced if related claims are consolidated for pretrial discovery on the common issues in a single forum.3 0 0 The results of
the document discovery and deposition process may then be admitted in the trial of each claim.
Courts should require the consolidation of claims for pretrial
discovery because it is generally impossible to obtain coordinated
30
discovery by relying on the voluntary cooperation of the litigants. '
Accordingly, the federal courts should manage most mass tort cases
by taking full advantage of the federal venue transfer rules allowing
the MDL Panel to consolidate related claims for pretrial purposes.3 0 2 This procedure is permissible in almost all mass torts, and
although cases in state court cannot be consolidated with those in
federal court, it is often possible to secure the cooperation of state
judges so that discovery on common issues in the federal venue is
30 3
also deemed admissible in state court proceedings.
The consolidation of claims by the MDL Panel for joint discovery, but not trial, will not unduly infringe on the plaintiff's interest
in individually controlling his claims. Although an individual plaintiff does have a legitimate interest in controlling discovery relating
to his own claim, this interest is comparatively less important than
his interest in controlling the forum in which his claim is tried, the
legal theories upon which he will proceed at trial, and the conduct
of the trial itself.30 4 In addition, procedures exist to minimize any
harm that the plaintiff's loss of control over discovery might occasion. While the consolidated cases are before the transferee judge,
or after they are remanded for trial, the judge may allow the individual plaintiff to make limited supplemental discovery on the common
issues along with the discovery which will be necessary on the nonSee supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text. Congress enacted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1982) in part because voluntary coordination of discovery in complex cases had
proven difficult and cumbersome. See S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 6-7
300
301

(1967).
302
303
304

See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITGATION, supra note 25, §§ 1.22, 1.94.
See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
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common issues unique to each plaintiff.3 0 5 In this way, the interests
of individual litigants in controlling the prosecution of their claims
can be safeguarded in most significant respects, yet substantial savings in litigation costs are possible.
Joint or coordinated discovery is also possible in common question and limited fund class actions, but these types ofjoinder contemplate the joint trial of the related claims. Although the joint trial
of common issues holds the promise of substantial efficiencies, the
unpredictable impact of this procedure on the basic fairness of the
process makes it unattractive as a routine procedure.3 0 6 Accordingly, consolidation of the related claims in a common venue for
pretrial purposes only, followed by the separate trial of each claim in
the transferor forum, is generally superior to the common question
class action as a tool for managing mass tort cases.
In mass tort cases involving numerous small claims for injuries
to property or for minor personal injuries, a common question class
action may prove superior to pretrial consolidation. In such cases
the individual litigant has a smaller interest in controlling his own
claim, thus making it less important to choose the fairest available
procedure. In these cases, where the claim might not be viable
outside a class action,30 7 the use of class actions and joint trials may
prove appropriate because no alternative procedure is practically
available to provide the victims with a damage remedy.3 08

305 See In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 969, 974 (J.P.M.D.L.
1979).
306 See supra notes 229-44, 273-87 and accompanying text.
307 See supra note 299.
308 The Advisory Committee stated that a class action may be appropriate where
"the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable." 39 F.R.D. at 104. Numerous courts have cited this rationale as justifying
certification of antitrust or securities fraud class actions involving otherwise nonviable
small claims. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 55 F.R.D. 269, 276 (D.D.C. 1972)
("[U]nless the claims of the members of these classes can be litigated on a class basis,
they cannot be feasibly litigated at all. While the total alleged injury to the class is large,
many individual class members may not have a large enough stake to justify litigating
their individual claims."); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 395 (E.D. La. 1970) (securities class action certified, in part, because "no one person may have been damaged to
the degree which would have induced him to institute litigation solely on his own behalf."). Most tort actions, however, arise under state law, and, therefore, a class of small
claimants could only be formed where each member's claim satisfies the $10,000
amount in controversy requirement. See supra note 35. As a result, only those mass tort
claims which exceed this jurisdictional threshold, but which are, nevertheless, too small
to be individually viable should be jointly tried. Compare duPont Glore Fergan, Inc. v.
AT&T, 69 F.R.D. 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (antitrust class action certified because, in
the absence of certification, "[tihe death knell may. . . sound upon a claim [exceeding
$10,000] when the heavy costs of litigation dictate its abandonment as a matter of economic reality, even though it may have merit").
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B. Joinder for Settlement
Although the common question class action is generally not desirable for trying mass tort cases involving substantial claims, its use
as a pretrial joinder device to facilitate group settlements is both
proper and desirable. Its use is proper because Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 provides that the court may certify a common
question class action when it will prove "superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." 3 0 9 A judicially supervised and approved class action settlement, like a judicially supervised trial, is a means of hearing and
determining judicially, in other words "adjudicating," 3 10 the value
of claims arising from a mass tort. As a result, if conditional certification of the case as a common question class action for settlement
purposes would enhance the prospects for a group settlement, then
31
rule 23 authorizes certification. '
The use of the common question class action to facilitate'settlement is desirable. No matter how much a mass tort defendant wants
to settle, three factors may complicate achievement of global settlement: (1) the large number of individual plaintiffs and lawyers; (2)
the existence of unfiled claims by putative plaintiffs; and (3) the inability of any single plaintiff to offer the settling defendant reliable
indemnity protection from the cross-claims of nonsettling defendants. The difficulty of structuring global settlements in the absence
ofjoinder thus contributes to the expense and delay typical of mass
31 2
tort cases.
The common question class action, when used as a settlement
device, can, however, help overcome this difficulty and reduce the
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (quoted supra note 36).
This interpretation of "adjudicate" in FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(b)(3) is consistent with
both the general and legal definition of the word. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 39 (rev.
5th ed. 1979) ("Adjudicate. . . To settle in the exercise ofjudicial authority. To determine finally."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DTIrxoARY 27 (1976) ("Adjudicate . . . to settle finally [the rights and duties of the parties to a court case] on the
merits of issues raised: enter on the records of a court (a final judgment, order or decree of sentence).").
311 Two federal judges recently certified class actions in mass tort cases in part because this joinder device would facilitate a global settlement of the litigation. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984); In re "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239, 240 (S.D.
Ohio) (while class action not appropriate for trial, it was proper as settlement device),
appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 58, writ of mandamusgranted on other grounds, 749 F.2d 300, 305
n.10 (6th Cir. 1984). See also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 173-78 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) (use of tentative settlement classes to facilitate settlement prior to formal certification of class action for trial purposes is
permissible).
312
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
309
310
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costs of such litigation even in a case not otherwise suitable for a
joint trial. It can facilitate a global settlement for several reasons.
First, the representative plaintiffs have the authority, subject to judicial approval, to settle the claims of all plaintiffs in the class who do
not opt out.3 13 Second, although class members may opt out if they

object to the proposed settlement, in doing so they must identify
themselves, thereby revealing all of the plaintiffs not included in the
class settlement to the defendant. The defendant can then attempt
to settle the claims of the opt-out plaintiffs individually, which may
be feasible if their number is relatively small. Third, the presence of
a class settlement fund allows the plaintiff class to offer the settling
defendant protection from the cross-claims of nonsettling defendants. The plaintiff class can, in exchange for a substantial class settlement payment, offer to indemnify the settling defendant from
further liability or litigation expense in connection with the mass
tort.3

14

Fourth, judicial determination of a reasonable award can

3 15
often resolve the vexing problem of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
If a large number of class members opt out of the proposed
class settlement, then the feasibility and attractiveness of the group
settlement may be lost. The court or the litigants may conclude that
a reasonable and acceptable settlement is thus rendered impossible.
This possibility should not lead courts to eschew use of the common
question class action as a settlement tool. The court can certify the
class on a conditional basis, 31 6 so that immediate decertification will
occur if an insufficient number of plaintiffs are willing to participate
in the proposed class settlement, if the court concludes the proposed settlement is unfair, or if the proposed settlement collapses
for other reasons.
Courts should not use the common question class action to facilitate settlement unless all the litigants involved are reasonably optimistic that an acceptable settlement can be reached if the class is
certified. The certification and later decertification of such an action
313
A class may not be dismissed or compromised without court approval. FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(e). See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123
(8th Cir.) (court has discretion to accept settlements and must act as "guardian of the
rights of absent class members"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
314 The plaintiffs and a number of the defendants used this type of global class settlement in the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire case. See Mesh, Handlinga Mass Disasteras a
Class Action, 27 Am. JUR. TRIALS § 75, at 567 (1980); see also Lewin, Faster Settling of Mass
Claims, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1984, at D2, col. 1 (use of class settlement fund facilitates
settlement of mass torts).
315
In a class action settlement, the court sets the total attorneys' fee award based on
the reasonable value of the services rendered. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974) (enumerating factors court should consider in determining reasonable value of services).
316 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) expressly provides that class action certification orders
may be conditional and may be altered or amended before trial.
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would result in unnecessary costs of notifying absent class members
and resulting disruption and delay in the litigation. 31 7 Moreover, in
order to protect the rights of all litigants, the court asked to certify
the conditional settlement class action should: (1) refuse to stay discovery during the settlement discussions; (2) conduct a preliminary
hearing to determine if there is "probable cause" to believe that the
proposed settlement is reasonable before conditionally certifying
the class; (3) conduct a second hearing on the reasonableness of the
settlement in which all putative class members may participate; and
(4) consider the use of an expert to assist in analyzing the fairness of
the proposed settlement. 318 Because of the special risks of improper collusion or other misconduct presented by a tentative settlement negotiated prior to certification, the court should be
"doubly careful in evaluating the fairness of the settlement" to the
plaintiff class. 3 19 Nevertheless, global settlement of mass torts
should be encouraged where possible and reasonable.
C.

Punitive Damages and Joinder

Although the joint trial of compensatory damage claims in mass
tort cases is undesirable, quite the opposite is true with respect to
punitive damage claims. Without a joint trial of punitive damage
claims there is both a substantial risk of excessive punitive damage
awards against the defendant and an inequitable distribution of the
awards among the plaintiffs.
Punitive damage claims have become commonplace in mass tort
actions. 3 20 The frequency of such claims has increased in recent
years for three reasons. First, all but four states now allow punitive
damages in tort actions to deter wrongdoing and promote the general welfare.3 2 1 Second, the plaintiff's burden in recovering punitive
317
In common question class actions, absent class members who can be identified
through reasonable effort must be given the best notice possible under the circumstances. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
318
See Developments in the Law--Class Actions, supra note 41, at 1552-67.
319
Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971); see also
A. MILLER, supra note 56, at 59-63. The court asked to pass on the reasonableness of the
proposed settlement in most mass tort cases will be the § 1407 transferee court, which
ought to have access to the information necessary to make this judgment.
320
See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 419 (W.D. Mo.) (in case
involving collapse of skywalk bridges class of plaintiffs certified for punitive damages),
vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899-900 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (numerous plaintiffs requested punitive damages for defect in intrauterine device), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). See also
infra note 323.
These four are: Louisiana, see Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1980);
321
Massachusetts, see Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968); Boott Mills v. Boston & M.R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 589, 106 N.E. 680,
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damages has been lightened by the decision of many states to allow
such awards where the defendant did not actually intend harm to
the plaintiff, but showed "such a conscious and deliberate disregard
of the interests of others that the conduct may be called willful or
wanton." 32 2 Third, the size of punitive damage awards permitted by
3 23
the courts, especially in mass product defect cases, has soared.
The amount of punitive damages awarded in most states is left to
the discretion of the jury, which considers the seriousness of the
defendant's misconduct, the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injury, and the wealth of the defendant. 3 24 Some states require a reasonable relationship between the amount of the compensatory
683-84 (1914); Nebraska, see Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 124, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474
(1975); and Washington, see Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 27 Wash. App. 512, 52122, 618 P.2d 1330, 1337 (1980) (no punitive damages in absence of statutory authorization), afd, 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981). For a state-by-state compilation of
punitive damages law, see K. REDDEN, PUNTVE DAMAGES § 5.2(A) (1980).
Three states, however, view punitive damages as a form of additional compensation,
thereby limiting the amount of such awards. These three are: Michigan, see Kewin v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 419, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (punitive damages designed to compensate for psychic harms not easily estimated in monetary terms, not to punish); New Hampshire, see Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 112 N.H.
71, 72-73, 289 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1972) (compensatory damages may be increased where
act is wanton, malicious, or oppressive), Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (damages may be increased to compensate for plaintiff's psychic injury, not to punish defendant); Connecticut, see United Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 161
Conn. 79, 106, 285 A.2d 330, 345 (1971) (Connecticut has a punitive damages doctrine
that is compensatory in nature; punitive damages may not exceed the plaintiff's litigation
expenses less taxable costs), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). By statute, Connecticut
limits punitive damages in products liability cases to twice the amount of compensatory
damages. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1983).
More than one half of the states do not allow punitive damages for wrongful death.
K. REDDEN, supra, § 4.2, at 87.
322

W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 2, at 10.

See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981) ($5 million
punitive damages award), modified on othergrounds, 670 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 673
F.2d 911 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Airco, Inc. v. Simmons
First Nat'l Bank, 276 Ark. 486, 638 S.W.2d 660 (1982) ($3 million punitive damages
award); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)
(jury verdict for $125 million in punitive damages reduced to $3.5 million by trial court);
Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 660 n.2, 437 N.E.2d 910, 914 n.2 (1982)
(citing a $10.5 million punitive damages award in California and $850,000 punitive
award in the MER-29 drug litigation in New York), rev'd, 98 Ill. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131
(1983); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.) ($1 million punitive
damages award), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.,
67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981) ($1.1 million punitive damages award). For
a listing of numerous multimillion dollar punitive damages awards, see Owens, Problems
in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products,49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
3 n.16 (1982).
324
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1977). The defendant's
wealth is relevant because a higher award is necessary to punish and deter the rich than
the poor. Id. See generally Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward A PrincipledApproach, 31 HASTINGS LJ.639, 663-70 (1980) (arguing that judges should determine punitive damages awards based on consideration of eight specified factors).
323

1985]

MASS TORTJOINDER

839

award and the amount of the punitive award 3 2 5 However, that requirement is frequently applied flexibly so that punitive damages
over sixty times greater than compensatory damages are sometimes
3 26
approved.
1. Fairnessand Multiple Punitive Damage Awards
Extraordinary problems of fairness to individual defendants
and equity among plaintiffs arise in mass tort cases when many
plaintiffs seek punitive damages against a defendant in several forums. Individual plaintiffs whose cases go to trial after a series of
punitive damage awards may be treated unfairly because they face
the possibility that their own claims for punitive damages may be
denied or discounted in light of the prior awards to other plaintiffs
3 27
or be uncollectable due to the defendant's insolvency.
Conversely, multiple punitive damage awards are unfair to defendants. Individual defendants face the prospect of a series of
huge punitive damage awards in separate trials if the plaintiffs are
allowed to proceed on an individual basis. Under such conditions,
the defendant's potential liability reaches staggering levels.3

28

The

primary check on excessive punitive damage awards is the trial
325
See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 964 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(Texas law requires "reasonable ratio" between punitive and compensatory awards)
(dicta), aft'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd in partand remanded in part on reh'g en banc,
665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982). See generally Comment, PunitiveDamages and the Reasonable
Relation Rule: A Study in Frustrationof Purpose, 9 PAC. LJ. 823, 824 nn.12-13 (1978) (discussing development and function of reasonable relationship rule in California and concluding that it conflicts with purposes of punitive damages awards) (listing states that
use reasonable relationship's rule).
326
See, e.g., Maxey, 450 F. Supp. at 957, 964-66 ($10 million punitive damages award,
some 60 times greater than compensatory award for $150,000, held within flexible ratio
rule, as applied in Texas, although the punitive damage award was stricken on other
grounds).
327
See infra note 333. Some similarly situated plaintiffs will also be denied the recovery of any punitive damages because of the way different courts view the same evidence.
In the MER-29 drug litigation, for example, a California state appellate court allowed a
plaintiff $250,000 in punitive damages after noting that it disagreed with the Second
Circuit's view in an earlier case that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant had acted recklessly and in wanton disregard of possible harm to others. Compare Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 715 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,
416 n.3 (1967) with Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 851 (2d Cir.
1967).
328
See Phelan, Punitive Damages-Standardsfor Award, Multiple Claims: Insurability in
MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE POTENTIAL FOR CORPORATE CATASTROPHE 53, 56 (1982);
see, e.g., Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 893 (total multiple punitive claims against defendant A.H. Robins exceeded $2 billion); Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 419 (plaintiffs
sought $500 million in punitive damages). See also Wall St.J., Oct. 11, 1983, at B43, col.
3 (reporting Love Canal claimants sought a total of $16 billion in compensatory and
punitive damages); Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at A5, col. 1 (reporting 450 lawsuits arising
out of fire at MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, in which plaintiffs claimed total of $2
billion in punitive damages).
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judge's postverdict review to determine whether the jury's action
was reasonable in light of the evidence and applicable law.
Although this check may prove adequate to avoid excessive awards
when a single plaintiff sues a defendant, it offers little help in preserving fairness to the parties in mass tort cases where the defendant's liability for punitive damages is adjudicated in many different
forums. In such circumstances no single judge controls the proceedings and no single judge can prevent the award of excessive
3 29
punitive damages.
Multiple punitive damage awards work a further unfairness to
the defendant. Punitive damages are not meant to compensate an
injured plaintiff; instead, they are intended to punish the defendant
and deter socially undesirable behavior. 3 30 Multiple punitive damage awards improperly go beyond this limited purpose and punish
the defendant many times for the same act or omission. Mass tort
defendants have nevertheless been subjected to multiple punitive
damage awards on the theory that the defendant owes a separate
duty to each plaintiff.33 1 This theory is flawed, however, because

when determining punitive damages the jury will probably have
before it evidence concerning not only the particular plaintiff's
claim, but the injury to other plaintiffs as well.3 3 2 In any given case,

therefore, the jury is likely to punish the defendant both for the injuries he caused that particular plaintiff and for the injuries caused to
plaintiffs litigating in other forums. Thus, unless all the punitive
damage claims are litigated in the same court, impermissible multi33 3
ple punishment becomes virtually inevitable.
329
See Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 900 ("Our law on punitive damages was created
in an era of single plaintiff versus single defendant disputes and has not yet been
adapted to the complexity of multi-party litigation.").
330 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) & comment a (1977).
331 See Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377-78 (E.D. Pa. 1982)

(asbestosis); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 318-19, 294 N.W.2d 437, 466
(1980) (mass product defect).
332 As Judge Friendly aptly stated in a mass product defect case involving the cataract drug MER-29:
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages on the
part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering. If all recovered punitive
damages in the amount here awarded these would run into tens of millions, as contrasted with the maximum criminal penalty of "imprisonment
for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both
such imprisonment and fine," 21 U.S.C. § 333(b), for each violation of
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act with intent to defraud or mislead. We
have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages
in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill.
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (footnote
omitted).

333 The dangers of multiple punitive damage awards have become a reality in the
litigation of mass tort claims seriatim against the Johns-Manville Corporation and other
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Commentators have proposed many techniques for protecting a
mass tort defendant from excessive punitive damage liability. They
include: abolishing punitive damages in such cases; 3 34 instructing
juries to consider prior awards and the potential for future
awards; 33 5 reducing the size of any individual award;3 36 and adding
asbestos manufacturers who have sought protection under the bankruptcy laws. See, e.g.,
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). More than 15,500
plaintiffs had brought suit against Manville, a manufacturer and supplier of asbestos, as
of 1983. Manville estimated that approximately 32,000 additional suits could be
brought against it in the next 27 years. It was also disclosed that since 1981 Manville
had been found liable for punitive damages in several asbestos lawsuits and anticipated
additional exemplary damages which would increase its potential liability in the asbestos
litigation to at least $2 billion over the next 20 years. Id. at 407-08. In light of these
financial difficulties, Manville filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy even though the company
purported to have a substantial net worth. See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating
Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1122 & n.7 (1983).
Asbestos manufacturers have already spent $1 billion on claims, but only about 4,000
out of the 25,000 claims filed have been closed. Main, The Hazards of Helping Toxic Waste
Victims, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 1983, at 158.
334
See Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4 (1969); Carsey, The
Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975);
Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases Should Not Be Allowed, 22
TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 46 (1978); Hoenig, ProductsLiability Problems andProposedReforms, 1977
INS. L.J. 213, 254-55; Snyman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 44
INS. COUNS.J. 402 (1977); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INs. COUNS.J.
300 (1972). Abolishing punitive damages in mass tort cases, but not single tort cases, is
illogical because it would result in punishment for those defendants who wantonly injure
one individual, but not those who wantonly injure many. Abolishing punitive damages
in all tort cases, or in cases involving certain kinds of torts (like mass product defect
cases), would eliminate the unfairness problem of multiple awards, but the deterrence
value of such awards would also be lost. Without the specter of punitive damages to
remind the defendant of the risk of deliberately placing the well-being of individuals at
risk, society would increasingly be exposed to hazardous products or conditions. See
Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975);
Igoe, PunitiveDamages in Products Liability Cases Should Be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 24,
29 (1978); Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257,
1282-87 (1976); Note, Mass Liability and PunitiveDamages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797,
1802 (1979). Rather than abolishing punitive damages in mass tort cases, some commentators have argued that some total aggregate cap be placed on the punitive damages
which can be imposed on a defendant for a single course of conduct. See Owens, supra
note 323, at 48-49 n.227 (lesser of either $5 million or five percent of defendant's net
worth); Riley, PunitiveDamages: The Doctrine ofJust Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 252
(1978).
335 See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 304, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459-60
(1980). Thejury might then do any subtraction or addition it wished after it concluded
the defendant was liable. This approach, however, is impossible to administer, is prejudicial to the defendant, undermines the deterrent value of punitive damages, and would
do little to assure fairness to defendants and among plaintiffs. Although the purpose of
this approach is to diminish the impact of multiple punishment for the same act, it is
unworkable because the jury would be speculating on matters impossible to predict. For
example, the jury would have to foresee all suits which will result from the wrongdoing
in question, consider all cases being adjudicated now and all cases already adjudicated,
and then predict the outcome of subsequent actions in order to apportion fairly an assumed "total" award to a particular plaintiff. See Note, supra note 334, at 1806. AsJudge
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on punishments. 3 3 7 In general, however, all such techniques are
Friendly noted in Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839, "it is hard to see what even the most intelligent jury would do with [such a command], being inherently unable to know what punitive damages, if any, other juries in other states may award other plaintiffs in actions yet
untried." Because of the uncertainty and speculation inherent in this scheme, there is
no guarantee that the second jury will award "reasonable" punitive damages, and many
defendants would oppose the proposed jury instruction on the theory that information
about earlier punitive damage verdicts increased the risk that the second jury would find
against the defendant on the liability issues. See Morris, PunitiveDamages in Tort Cases, 44
H~Av. L. REV. 1173, 1195 n.40 (1931); see also Wheeler, The ConstitutionalCasefor Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 295 (1983) (arguing that allowing
evidence of past punitive damages awards increases likelihood that jury will award such
damages). Information about other punitive awards may also damage the defendant if
the jury, rather than tempering its possible award of punitive damages, decides not to be
outdone in the amount awarded. SeeJ. GH1ARDI &J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 5.42, at 129 (1984). In Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 840, Judge Friendly said:
[We] think it somewhat unrealistic to expect a judge, say in New Mexico,
to tell ajury their fellow townsman should get very little by way of punitive damages because [plaintiffs in other cases elsewhere] . . . had
stripped that cupboard bare, even assuming the defendant would want
such a charge, and still more unrealistic to expect that the jury would
follow such an instruction or that, if they didn't, the judge would reduce
the award below what had become the going rate.
336 See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 840. A predetermined cap on awards in individual cases
could be calculated to reduce the risk of excessive punishment and would guide individual juries in the exercise of their discretion. Wheeler, supra note 335, at 299. This approach, however, is plagued with difficulties. Thejudge in the first case would not have
a sound basis for calculating the proper cap on recoveries in individual cases. Thejudge
in the first case to go to trial, for example, would not know whether the other pending
and unfiled suits against the same defendant will result in punitive damages awards.
Thus, like the jurors considering earlier awards and possible later awards, the judge
would have to speculate. See Note, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 895, 920-21 (1976). Such a scheme might also compromise the deterrent
function of punitive damages. A fixed limit on punitive damage awards in individual
cases based solely on a guess as to the number of future cases resulting in punitive
damage awards inherently carries with it a risk that the deterrent effect will be blunted
where the limit is set too low or of excessive punishment where the limit is set too high.
Multiple trials of the punitive damage issue would still be necessary, and wide variations
in the punitive damage recoveries of successful plaintiffs would persist.
337 Under this approach, the first jury to hear the case would give whatever punitive
award it thought proper, subject to reduction by the trial judge, and subsequent juries
would not be informed of previous punitive damage awards. Thejury would function as
if it alone were to determine whether the defendant's conduct deserved punishment
and, if so, the amount of punishment the defendant deserved. The trial judge would
examine the punitive damage award returned by the jury to determine whether the
amount awarded was excessive. Before judgment was entered, however, the defendant
would present proof as to any prior judgment for punitive damages which he had satisfied. The plaintiff would then be entitled to punitive damages only to the extent that the
amount awarded exceeded the highest punitive award the defendant had previously satisfied. This process would continue until no more actions seeking punitive damages
were brought against the defendant for the same course of conduct. This procedure is
intended to assure that the defendant will not escape the severest punishment for his
wrongful act a single jury and judge find appropriate, and yet avoid the unfairness and
possibly catastrophic financial consequences of a series of punitive damage awards. See
Note, supra note 334, at 1808-13. Although perhaps superior to the other approaches
described, this procedure does nothing to assure a fair and equitable division of the
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either unworkable,3 3 8 pose substantial fairness problems to the affected plaintiffs,3 3 9 or are otherwise inferior to the joint trial of all
related punitive damage claims in a single forum before a single
trier of fact.

3 40

2. Joint Trial of Punitive Damage Claims
When related mass tort cases involve numerous punitive damage claims, a common question class action limited to the issue of
punitive damages offers the greatest assurance of fairness to both
plaintiffs and defendants. The resulting joint trial before a single
court facilitates the fair distribution of punitive damages among
plaintiffs and offers a single defendant protection against excessive
multiple awards. 3 4 1 Although joint trials pose special problems,
these benefits justify their use to manage the adjudication of punitive damage claims.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) and similar state rules
permit courts to sever the punitive damage claims of mass tort victims from compensatory claims3 42 because generally they are not so
punitive damage recovery among successful plaintiffs. The problem of anomalous punitive damage recoveries among plaintiffs would persist because this procedure restricts
the recoverability of punitive damages properly awarded in later cases by virtue of earlierjudgments and thus encourages a race to the courthouse to get the first fully recoverable award.
338
See supra notes 334-37.
339
340

Id.

See Phelan, supra note 328, at 59-69; Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81
L. REV. 1787, 1795-96 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Punitive Damages]; Note,
The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple Punishment, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REv. 153, 157-63 [hereinafter cited as Note, Multiple Punishment].
341
In Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839-40 n. 11, Judge Friendly observed:
If there were any way in which all cases could be assembled before a
single court, as in a limitation proceeding in admiralty, it might be possible for a jury to make one award to be held for appropriate distribution
among all successful plaintiffs, although even as to this the difficulties are
apparent.
Accord, Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658-59, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913
(1982) (court suggests that defendants subject to multiple tort actions request trial court
to certify class action to adjudicate punitive damages), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Il. 2d
324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983); Bartolo v. Boardwalk Regency Hotel Casino, Inc., 185 NJ.
Super. 540, 546 n.1, 449 A.2d 1343, 1346 n.1 (1982) ("all plaintiffs should be required
to reach a joint decision whether they accept the remititur or to pursue a new trial");
Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 72, 618 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1980) (court suggests use of
class action to adjudicate punitive damages or jury consideration of undue burden
caused by multiple punitive damages awards against defendant); Redden, supra note
321, § 4.16, at 134 ("there should only be one award of punitive damages for the entire
class of victims"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1979) ("In a
class action involving all claims, full assessment of the punitive damages can be
made ..
").
342
See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text. Many states have rules or statutes
identical or very similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note
335, § 12.05, at 15 & n.1. Some states allow only bifurcation of separate claims, not
MICH.
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intertwined that separate trials would impose unfairness on either
plaintiff or defendant.34 3 Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators,3 4 4 however, the common question class action limited to
the issue of punitive damages must await the adjudication of the individual plaintiffs' compensatory damage claims. In the vast majority of states, a cause of action for punitive damages does not exist
3 45
absent proof of actual injury and, minimally, nominal damages.
Courts are reluctant to punish conduct, no matter how reprehensible, which in fact causes no legal injury.3 4 6 The fact that an individual plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages must be proved;
it cannot be presumed.3 4 7 Consequently, allowing a plaintiff to join
a common question class action limited to punitive damages without
prior proof of his entitlement to compensatory damages would improperly alter the substantive rights of the parties in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act. 3 48 The uncertainty surrounding which victims
are entitled to punitive damages would also violate two prerequi3 49
sites for a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
Only after adjudication of all compensatory claims could the court
separate issues. Id. § 12.05, at 15 & n.2. In these states, however, punitive damages
may be considered "separate but dependent" claims and thus subject to severance. Id.
§ 12.07, at 20. Only four states, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, and New Hampshire, have no severance rules, and it remains unclear whether the trial judge could rely
on his inherent authority and sever punitive damage claims in these states. Id. § 12.08,
at 8-15.
343
See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Holben v. Midwest Emery Freight Syss., 525 F. Supp. 1224, 1225 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (court approved severance of
punitive claim in motor vehicle accident); see also J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note
335, § 12.04, at 9 (severance of compensatory and punitive damage claims proper in
mass product defect cases). But see United Airlines v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th
Cir.) (court refused to sever punitive and compensatory damage claims because California law required unified assessment of liability and damages), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924
(1961).
344 See Note, Punitive Damages, supra note 340, at 1797-1810; Note, Multiple Punishment, supra note 340, at 163-74.
345 See PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417 F.2d 659, 663
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970); Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 276-77,
149 A.2d 648, 652 (1959); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 208-10
(1973).
346 See, e.g., Dicker v. Smith, 215 Kan. 212, 216, 523 P.2d 371, 375 (1974).
347 See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text; see also Kline v. Coldwell, Banker
& Co., 508 F.2d 226, 236 n.8 (9th Cir. 1974) (each member of class must prove damages), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir.
1974) (same); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) (same),
vacated on othergrounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). For this reason some courts have held that
the Rules Enabling Act forbids so-called fluid class damage awards where the fact of
damage to a class of persons is presumed in whole or part. See, e.g., Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 66 (4th Cir. 1977)(class-wide proof of damages in private
antitrust actions would contravene Rules Enabling Act), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
348 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1978); supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
349 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. These two requirements are, first, that there be an identifiable class, and, second, that the representative plaintiff be a member of the class. Id.
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identify which plaintiffs were entitled to join the punitive damage
class action, the size of the plaintiff class, and whether the named
representatives were in fact members of that class.3 5 0 A common
question class action limited to the question of punitive damages
thus requires the court to sever the plaintiffs' compensatory and punitive damage claims, certify a common question class action limited
to the issue of punitive damages, allow the compensatory claims to
be adjudicated in individual trials, and, subsequently, proceed to a
joint trial of the punitive claims of the successful plaintiffs.
Citing the difficulty of bringing all mass tort plaintiffs before a
single court under the federal venue transfer and consolidation
rules, 3 5 1 some commentators assert that courts should liberally allow limited fund class actions in order to compel the complete join3 52
der of all punitive damage claims arising out of a mass tort.
Limited fund class actions do prevent unfairness because they allow
only a single punitive damage award against the defendant and subject the distribution of any recovery among the plaintiff class tojudicial supervision and approval. 35 3 Plaintiffs may, however, be joined
in a limited fund class action only: (1) where there is a reaso~hable
likelihood that the plaintiffs' claims will exceed the defendant's
available assets; 3 54 or (2) where legal limits restrict the size or
number of awards against a defendant.3 5 5 The first test can rarely
be satisfied in limited fund punitive damage class actions because
the probability of a punitive damage award and its amount are entirely speculative. Juries have broad discretion to refuse to award
punitive damages even when the plaintiff proves all necessary elements of the claim. 35 6 The probable amount of the jury's punitive
damage award is also unpredictable because it too is committed to
the jury's discretion.3 57 Accordingly, only in the few states that explicitly restrict the size or number of punitive damage awards 358 may
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
352
See Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Contro4 52 FORDHAm L. REV. 37, 83 (1983); Note, Punitive Damages,supra
note 340, at 1797; see also Note, Class Certification, supra note 23, at 1157.
353
See supra note 313.
354
See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
355
See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415,424-25 (W.D. Mo.), vacatedon other
grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Seltzer, supra note
352, at 72-74, 81; Note, Punitive Damages,supra note 340, at 1801 n.77.
356
D. DOBBS, supra note 345, at 204 (punitive damages are not given as of right in
any state). See, e.g., Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp., 111 Cal.App. 2d 431, 244 P.2d
764 (1952) (instruction to jury that if certain motives were found, this would "entitle"
the plaintiff to punitive damages was error since the jury has complete discretion in
deciding whether to make such awards).
357
See supra notes 324 and accompanying text.
358
See supra note 321.
350
351
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forced joinder 59 of the plaintiffs' punitive damage claims occur in a
3 60
limited fund class action.
The common question class action thus constitutes the only
joinder device widely available for arranging the joint trial of punitive damage claims in mass tort cases. Although plaintiffs may opt
out of the plaintiff class, the common question class action preserves
fairness in the adjudication of punitive damage claims.
The factors militating against the joint trial of claims for compensatory damages do not apply with the same force to punitive
damage claims. First, the plaintiff's legitimate interest in retaining
individual control over the prosecution of a punitive damage claim
is much weaker than his interest in individually controlling his compensatory damage claim.3 6 1 A plaintiff enjoys no individual entitlement to punitive damages commensurate with his right to be
compensated for his injury.3 62 Using its discretion, the trier of fact
awards punitive damages not to compensate the plaintiff as an individual, but to punish the defendant and to protect society as a
whole.3

63

Depriving an individual mass tort plaintiff of control over

the prosecution of a punitive damage claim does not, therefore, significantly interfere with the traditional freedom accorded litigants in
personal injury litigation.
Second, the formidable requirement for a common question
class action, that common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members, 3 64 is more easily satisfied in punitive than in compensatory damage class actions. In a class action
limited to the issue of punitive damages,3 65 a common nucleus of
operative facts often control disposition of all plaintiffs' claims. In
359
Pending claims in state court and the Anti-Injunction Act may further restrict the
availability of limited fund punitive damage class actions in federal court. See supra note
123.
360
It is always possible that trial judges will reduce punitive damage awards in subsequent mass tort cases based upon prior punitive damage awards. See supra text accompanying note 329. Whether this will occur in a particular case is inherently
unpredictable, however. Id. Therefore, it is doubtful that a limited fund punitive damage class action is proper on this basis because whether the ability of subsequent plaintiffs to obtain punitive damage awards will be "substantially impaired" due to prior
awards is unknown. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom., In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984).
361
See Putz & Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They
Survive, 16 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 23-24, 33-34 (1981).
362
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981).
363
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977); Neal v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928 n.13, 582 P.2d 90, 990 n.13, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 n.13
(1978).
364
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
365 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A) allows a class action to be prosecuted as to some
issues but not others.
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mass product defect cases, for example, the defendant's acquisition,
extent, and disposition of knowledge regarding the product's dangers largely determine the defendant's liability and are factual questions common to the entire class.3 66 Where different state laws
control the punitive damage claims of different plaintiffs, the court
may choose to allow subclasses,3 6 7 or simply exclude plaintiffs from
the class who cannot recover punitive damages under applicable
state law.
Unlike limited fund class actions, a plaintiff may opt out of a
common question class action. 368 Opt-outs undermine the potential
fairness and efficiency of a punitive damage class action by resurrecting the prospect of multiple trials and multiple punitive damage
awards against a single defendant. Faced with a large number of
plaintiffs either opposing certification or opting out after certification, a trial court may elect not to certify a class or to decertify an
existing class.3 69 To reduce the threat of opt-outs, subsequent
courts should prohibit the opt-outs from pursuing their individual
claims for punitive damages.3 7 0 This restriction fully satisfies the rationale underlying the punitive damage remedy: as a matter of substantive law, opt-outs enjoy no personal right to recover punitive
damages, 37 ' and courts should not allow them to assert additional
punitive damage claims. 37 2 Alternatively, if opt-outs are allowed to
assert a claim for punitive damages, then trial courts should postpone hearing their claims pending resolution of the punitive damage class action. Only then can the trial court measure the
366
See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F.
Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). Accord, In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d
1175, 1189 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cbrt. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
367
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
368 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Plaintiffs might opt out of a punitive damage class
action because of the perceived disadvantage of sharing an award that they might each
receive if their claims were tried individually. Phelan, supra note 328, at 69-70. Alternatively, plaintiffs may object to representation by an attorney not of their choice.
369
The Ninth Circuit reversed a nationwide punitive damage class action certification order in Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 850-51, in large part because of the plaintiffs'
widespread opposition to the order.
370
A persuasive argument for a complete bar on punitive damage claims by opt-out
plaintiffs is advanced by Putz & Astiz, supra note 361, at 21-36. In In re Asbestos School
Litig., 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 8 (E.D. Pa. 1984) the trial court certified a limited
fund punitive damage class action and a common question compensatory damage class
action. The court declared that plaintiffs who opted out of the latter could sue only for
compensatory damages and not for punitive damages. Id. at 24. Those who opted out
could, however, settle their punitive damage claims with the defendants later receiving a
credit for any such settlements when and if there was a classwide award of punitive damages. Id.
371
See supra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
Putz & Astiz, supra note 361, at 31-36.
372
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reasonableness of subsequent punitive damage awards to opt-outs
and reduce or reverse them where necessary.
Either of these two approaches should satisfactorily reduce the
number of plaintiffs choosing to opt out of the class. The first approach removes the incentive for plaintiffs to opt out. The second
greatly reduces the likelihood of opt-outs. In either case, the bare
possibility of opt-outs should not discourage courts from certifying
a punitive damage class action. Even if a substantial number of
plaintiffs opt out, the court can later either decertify the class or
proceed with the class action if it would help reduce the evils of
3 73
multiple punitive damage trials and awards in mass tort cases.
CONCLUSION

The possible efficiencies of joinder in mass tort cases must be
weighed against the imperative of preserving fairness in the trial of
substantial personal injury or wrongful death claims. Whatever
merit relaxed notions of due process may have when otherwise nonviable claims arejointly tried,3 74 these notions have no place in mass
tort cases where the usually substantial compensatory damage
claims of mass tort victims deserve an uncompromised due process.
Although more efficient adjudication of liability issues in mass tort
cases would be desirable, it is improper to seek this end through
consolidation or common question class actions leading to the joint
trial of the issues common to the related claims. In substantial personal injury or wrongful death cases, the joint trial of common issues adversely affects the traditional right of tort litigants to control
the individual prosecution of their liability claims and unpredictably
skews the fairness of the trial process. Moreover, the presence of
noncommon liability and damage issues which must be severed for
separate trial offset the modest, if not ephemeral, gains in efficiency
made possible by the joint trial of common issues.
Available joinder rules permit consolidation for pretrial discov373

In mass product defect and occupational exposure cases where a large number of

unidentified persons potentially suffered latent injures allegedly due to the defendant's
defective product, courts should exercise special care in certifying punitive damage class
actions. Persons exposed to asbestos, for example, may manifest no symptoms of asbestosis, mesothelioma, or lung cancer until many years after exposure. See Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 113 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 n.3, 1040 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007, reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 951 (1982). In such cases, courts should carefully
define the class to exclude latent tort victims so that the class actionjudgment or settlement will not extinguish their punitive damages claim. If the latent tort victims subsequently sue, the judge could consider the prior punitive damage awards in assessing the
reasonableness of subsequent punitive awards.
374 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 299, at 434 ("In class actions necessity makes due
process.") (footnote omitted).
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ery on common issues, as well as common question class actions to
facilitate global settlements. The liberal use of these techniques is
warranted because they result in the more efficient adjudication of
mass tort cases while avoiding the untoward and adverse consequences of ordering joint trials.
Punitive damage claims in mass tort cases merit special treatment, however, and special procedures are required to manage
these claims fairly. The separate trial of punitive damage claims in
such cases creates a substantial risk of excessive awards against the
defendant and the inequitable distribution of such awards among
plaintiffs. The joint trial of such claims is proper because it facilitates the fair assessment and distribution of punitive damage
awards. Accordingly, given available joinder alternatives, the severing and subsequent joint trial of punitive damage claims best serves
the goals of efficiency and fairness.

